Anarchy, State, and Utopia

If you have any interest in political philosophy at all, if you are worried about the erosion of individual liberty (and its companion, individual responsibility) in modern society, or (even) if you are a collectivist and actually promote government involvement in our individual lives for the "greater good" at the expense of some or all, you MUST read this book. It is a somewhat difficult book to digest, so others (political moderates or those apathetic with regard to political philosophy) need not even crack the cover.
If you find that you agree with the arguments and conclusions of Robert Nozick, you will be enriched with ammunition for debating political philosophy. If you DON'T agree and you believe that your disagreement is based upon sound philosophy, you will still be greatly rewarded - if for no other reason than you were required to expend some great effort to refute the presented material as you read it.
The major principles presented and defended by Mr. Nozick are as follows:
1) Anarchy is not tenable. 2) A "minimal state" or "nightwatchman state" that only protects the rights of its constituents is justified/legitimate. 3) any state beyond that "minimal state" is unjustified/illegitimate because it will inherently violate the rights of (at least) some of its constituents.
Beyond these major principles, Mr. Nozick also revisits the concept of Utopia in the last section of the text. I found this last section very enjoyable. Mr. Nozick's presentation of the concept of "Meta-Utopia" opened up whole new avenues of political thought for me.
I agree with the major principles of this work as I have stated them above; however, I found that I did not agree with everything presented. I enjoyed the mental exercise required to think through many of the presented topics. I was very pleased to realize the existence of this book and to read it.
Not that it has any bearing on the significance of the presented material, I did find the book to be quite difficult to read. Similar to what many critics and reviewers of this book have stated before, I found the organization of the presented material lacking and the absence of concise summaries of major topics disappointing. I found myself wishing that this were not the case - so that I might glean more benefit from the reading of the book. Also, Mr. Nozick seems too quick to prolifically digress into tangent discussions. Although the topics of these tangent discussions are quite interesting, it is my opinion that, coupled with the organization problem already mentioned, the frequency and magnitude of these discussions detracts from the persuasiveness of the book.
Even with the shortcomings, I feel some great deal of enlightenment and joy after reading this book. Mr. Nozick obviously respects and attempts to understand opposing views to the degree that he is willing to examine them with great scrutiny and then, aptly, present his arguments against them. Since I read books like this one to help me seek answers to philosophical political and otherwise) questions, I found it refreshing that an author would approach (or at least, attempt to approach) such arguments so objectively.
As I said at the beginning of this review, anyone with an interest in political philosophy will find the reading of this book to be time and thought well spent.

Rawls and Nozick were responsible for reinvigorating rights-based liberalism in the 20th century, saving political philosophy from mere in-fighting among utilitarians, and the superstitions of Marxism. Political philosophy since is largely a response to Rawls and Nozick.

This is a work of genius, though it is frequently misunderstood, perhaps on purpose. Most readers, including important philosophers like Thomas Nagel, simply misunderstand the argumentative structure, with the result that many famous criticisms of the book are irrelevant.

Nozick's thesis is that a minimal state can be justified, but a more than minimal state cannot, except under unusual situations.

Part I of the book is addressed to other libertarians, specifically market anarchists (also called anarcho-capitalists). As such, Nozick assumes libertarian rights of self-ownership (or self-governance). Basically, Nozick wants to show market anarchists that a minimal state can arise without violating anybody's rights, where the rights in question are things that all parties to the debate agree that we have. To do so, he describes a scenario in which security companies come inevitably to have natural monopolies over geographic areas. After providing a highly original analysis of the nature of risk and its moral implications, plus a hugely important discussion of side constraints and moral prohibitions, Nozick establishes that such a monopoly would legitimately prohibit other security firms and independent enforcers from operating in its area, provided it compensates everyone involved. The most natural form of compensation is free security. Nozick then argues that an equilibrium will occur in which the security of all can be provided for with an analogue of coercive taxation.

At the end of this section, Nozick, provided the argument is successful (and there are good reasons to think it is not) has established that an agency provided court, military, and police services in a geographic area will arise without violating rights and without the explicit intention of creating a state.

A very common misreading of Nozick occurs here. Many philosophers think Nozick believes that only a state that does arise in this manner and has this form (of a security company with private shareholders) can be legitimate. Nozick didn't think this and isn't committed to it. Instead, what he believes he has shown is both that a minimal state is desirable (it would arise unintentionally as a result of spontaneous order because it is superior to market anarchy) and legitimate. Nozick can then say that this leaves open whether the state will be democratic and in what way.

The second part of the book is meant to challenge arguments for the more than minimal state. It is also misunderstood, even by very smart people. Nozick does not assume libertarian rights in part II, though he refers to them at times. Instead, his argument consists of three factors. First, he primarily addresses egalitarian liberals (hereafter e-liberals). E-liberals believe that rights to personal freedoms (sexual activity, etc.) are justified, but hold that economic activity can be controlled by government decree. Nozick examines e-liberals reasons for wanting a more-than-minimal state (such as a welfare state or social democracy), and debunks them by drawing analogies between the economic activity the e-liberal would regulate and personal freedoms the e-liberal desires to leave free. If the e-liberal cannot identify a morally salient difference, she is forced to either deny the personal freedom, thus becoming an authoritarian, or admit that the economic activity should remain free, thus conceding Nozick's point.

Another style of argument used in part II is what I will call "the liberal presumption" argument. The liberal presumption is that any human activity ought to remain unregulated by laws unless some strong reason can be shown to regulate the activity. (This can be contrasted against the authoritarian presumption, which Mussolini and Stalin held, namely that any activity ought to be governed unless strong reason can be shown to let it be free.) Nozick addresses e-liberals, who hold the liberal presumption, and then attacks the reasons they offer in support of regulating various activities. He shows that the reasons are based on misunderstandings and bad arguments, thus restoring the liberal presumption.

The last type of argument does not rely on this presumption. Nozick addresses Marxists, for instance, who are not liberals. His arguments against them consists mostly of just showing what's wrong with their position. For instance, Marxist exploitation theory crucially depends upon bad economic theory, such as the labor theory of value, something which was shown false back in the early 1870s. (Almost all contemporary economists would agree with Nozick on this. Marxism is to smart people what creationism is to dumb people, a pseudo-science.)

The result of these arguments is to show that the more than minimal state cannot be justified.

Along the way, in part II, Nozick provides us with some gems. He gives the first major critique of Rawls. The critique is devastating, as Nozick points out mistakes in Rawls reasoning (simple logical errors, etc.) that leave Rawls' project ungrounded. Rawls, for some reason, never responded to this critique. Nozick also analyzes envy, and provides hypothetical histories to arrive at the more than minimal state that uncover its nature (it is logically equivalent to system in which we all own parts of each other). He also sketches a theory of justice in holdings to contrast with Rawls, Dworkin, and others. This theory, the entitlement theory, is very rough, but it provides a welcome alternative to simplistic theories maintaining that all there is to justice is establishing patterns of ownership.

Part III is the least often read and least understood part of the book. Partly, it provides a contractarian argument for libertarianism (see Loren Lomasky's article in David Schmidtz' book, Robert Nozick, contemporary philosophy in focus). It thus contains some of the foundations that Nagel claims Nozick lacks (though this criticism is based on Nagel's mistaken reading.) In part III, Nozick asks us to try to construct a system that allows for experimentation and in which everyone, despite their differences, can find a society that allows them to live out their conceptions of the good. The system that best approaches this is a libertarian framework, inside of which non-libertarian communities may be established provided they respect other, different communities. Part III is sketchy, but contains seeds of brilliant things, and it is too bad it hasn't been explored more.

Overall, I would say that the argument of part I is the weakest, part II is the strongest, and part III the most interesting and ripe with philosophical potential.

If you care about political philosophy, you owe it to yourself to read this book. You also owe it to yourself to understand it. If you find yourself thinking Nozick is making a dumb mistake or begging the question, you've misunderstood. But you'll be in good company.

To refute the propoganda that was written about Nozick by reveiwer Roger Albin, that Nozick is no longer a Libertarian, here is a an interview with Nozick in an article that appeared originally on the Liberator Online September 11, 2001:
Robert Nozick (1939-2002) is one of the most respected and honored philosophers in the world.
In 1974, Nozick -- then a largely unknown thirty-five-year-old professor of philosophy at Harvard -- published Anarchy, State, and Utopia. The book startled and amazed reviewers, reached a huge audience, and immediately established Nozick's reputation as a major new figure in philosophy -- in fact, as an international intellectual celebrity.
Anarchy, State, and Utopia was a rigorous examination and defense of libertarianism. It was controversial, exciting, and -- most shockingly for a serious philosophical work -- a pleasure to read. And it is hard to overstate the book's importance to libertarianism.
As Laissez Faire Books editor Roy Childs wrote in 1989:
"Nozick's 'Anarchy, State, and Utopia' single-handedly established the legitimacy of libertarianism as a political theory in the world of academia. Indeed, it is not too much to say that without Nozick's book, there might not be a vital and growing academic libertarian movement today, making its way from university to university, from discipline to discipline, from nation to nation."
So it was all the more shocking (and tragic for libertarianism) when, in his 1989 book "The Examined Life," Nozick hinted he had rejected the libertarian philosophy he presented so brilliantly in "Anarchy, State and Utopia." Rumors begin flying that Nozick had abandoned libertarianism. Some even said he had embraced socialism!
In a fascinating and far-ranging new interview with Laissez Faire Books Associate Editor Julian Sanchez, Nozick said he'd been a libertarian all along.
An excerpt:
Sanchez: "In 'The Examined Life' (1989), you reported that you had come to see the libertarian position that you'd advanced in 'Anarchy, State and Utopia' (1974) as 'seriously inadequate.'
But there are several places in 'Invariances' where you seem to suggest that you consider the view advanced there, broadly speaking, at least, a libertarian one. Would you now, again, self-apply the L-word?"
Robert Nozick: "Yes. But I never stopped self-applying it. What I was really saying in 'The Examined Life' was that I was no longer as hardcore a libertarian as I had been before. But the rumors of my deviation (or apostasy!) from libertarianism were much exaggerated. I think this book makes clear the extent to which I still am within the general framework of libertarianism, especially the ethics chapter and its section on the 'Core Principle of Ethics.'"
NOTE: Nozick's scholarly work is not casual reading. Yet it is well worth the effort for the serious student of ideas. We never recommend Anarchy, State and Utopia without also passing along Roy Child's wisdom on how to read this marvelous book: "Two final things to remember: This is a book of many parts, and you can usually skip a section without harm, returning to it later. Finally, Nozick sometimes retreats into math and other modes of argument that are beyond me. I always skip this stuff and I've never had a single sleepless night over it."

This book represents a crucial turning point in American political philosophy. It should be mandatory reading for anyone who would start making sense of the differences between pre-Reagan and post-Reagan political views of the world. By comparing the style and substance of this book with Rawl's Theory of Justice one might learn much about the philosophies that have driven the politics of these two eras.

This book is presented in three sections. The first argues for a 'minimal state' in preference to anarchy. The second attacks 'utopian' notions of society. The third poses the author's own model of the 'utopian' state. There is a glittery, shiny, mathematical precision to the arguments. And when one encounters arguments that make sense, the sketchy quality works to the book's advantage and the book shines.

In the first section the author imagines established societies without the protection of governmental bodies. He posits the evolutionary development of hypothetical security companies and illustrates how these firms would always fall short of providing the minimal protections even their own clients should reasonably expect. He derives a hypothetical governing body he calls the 'minimal state.' This body has the rights to do certain things we normally associate with government, But these rights, he argues, fall far short of those posited by others, including our own government. If one assumes away most of the problems industrial societies face, Nozick's notion of the 'minimal state' is an interesting one and perhaps even a sensible one. He certainly makes the case that it is preferable to anarchy.

To the extent that the last chapter is construed as an argument about the 'unabridged rights of free association,' it also stikes one as being sensible and clear; brilliant, even. But the author's argument is too sketchy to robustly support his grandiose intention.

The second section is more difficult to believe than the other two. Consider a counterargument Nozick poses to refute one argument in Rawls' Theory of Justice.' This argument is related to a queston about how to divide among a group's participants the excess gains that are realized as a result of cooperation. (Paraphrased for clarity.)

1) People are entitled to their natural assets ( i.e. intelligence, strength, so on)
2) People are entitled to the benefits that flow from their natural assets. (i.e. income)
3) People's holdings accumulate as benefits from their natural assets.
4) People deserve their holdings because of rightful means by which they accumulate.
5) It is wrong to wrest holdings from people if they deserve them.

The author suggests that Rawls would rebut this syllogism at line 1. Then he proposes an argument which reaches the same conclusion but avoids positing 1) . And claims victory.

Not so fast. The second line of the argument , 2), could mean that people deserve 'all of the benefits that flow exclusively from their natural assets.' This is a premise that is a little hard to dispute, but has no legs. It does not carry the argument where it needs to go, because practically speaking such cases are never in dispute. Alternatively it could mean that people deserve 'all of the benefits that flow at least in part from their natural assets.' It is upon this meaning that Nozick must base his argument if it has any relevance to the cooperative behavior that pervades the modern world. But this interpretation is of no help in resolving the disputed claims of ownership that arise regarding the excess profits of cooperation. All parties involved do precisely this - claim all the benefits that flow in part from their natural assets. And we arrive back at the problem Rawls was trying to solve in the first place. Nozick's counter-argument is only helpful in trivial, practically indisputable cases that involve no cooperation.

There are a number of other very simple objections one can raise to Nozick's syllogism. It appears, for instance, not to properly treat the case of children. This argument is too simple and its implications too involved to state here.

Perhaps we have misunderstood the author in this case. Still, this example illustrates a kind of disconnection with reality that pops up now and again throughout the second and third sections - a failure to recheck the mathematically derived world against common sense understanding of the real one. It represents a case where the form of an argument is the means of persuasion rather than its sense. And the form is set up by the facile wordings of the starting premises. The appeal to pure logic might be compared to the appeal of a geometric proof (one whose premises might be a little shaky, perhaps).

Or it might be compared with a Rolls Royce Silver Shadow. It is bright and shiny and attractive. One might be left with the sense that the author, starting in London, has pointed his Silver Shadow of reason in the correct direction and, in attempt to drive it to the resource-rich continent of Australia, is methodically driving it right over the precipice at the Cliffs of Dover.

Robert Nozick argues from the (Kantian) principle that nothing and nobody can use an individual as a means rather than an end. We are inviolable in ourselves as individuals and as owners of our property (legitimately acquired in the form of land etc.; or understood as our bodies/minds). Any boundary crossing not expressly consented to, is a violation of these fundamental negative rights. Understood as such, any state that seeks to redistribute through taxation is performing an unconsented-to boundary crossing, and is therefore guilty of violation of these fundamental rights.
It's altogether a very impressive feat of logical, consistent argumentation from first principles. I find the book impeccable. I am not a libertarian after reading Nozick's book, but it has forced me to devote a lot of time and energy to working out why I'm not a libertarian. After all, who can disagree with the principle of `don't do to others what you wouldn't want others to do to you'? The morality underlying Nozick's edifice is entirely acceptable, and yet as the argument progresses I found myself getting more and more uncomfortable. The problem has to do with which rights you might agree are fundamental and inviolable. Is the right to property, however acquired, fundamental to liberty? Nozick argues that it is. Without justice in property, there is no justice. Or Freedom. Or Liberty. Without the concept of private property, we are all potentially slaves to the State.
Concomitant with that proposition is an attitude which can be labelled `individual atomism'. Nozick, in keeping with other libertarians like Von Mises, Rothbard and Hoppe believes that individuals are paramount, unique and indivisible. Nothing may impinge on them. They enter the world fully formed (philosophically speaking) and exist before, above and outside of society. Indeed, I suspect that for most libertarians, society is a rootless (pointless?) concept. This isn't necessarily a provable falsity. It is a view-point which however, is myopic. For by focussing so exclusively on one aspect of individuality, it ignores a host of other elements that contribute to individuality. Humans do not grow up alone. Our very being - in whatever category you choose to view it (philosophically, developmentally, ethically, biologically) - is formed in relation to, in opposition to, in agreement with others of our species (and, indeed, with other species). There is a totality which, through a `perspective shift' suddenly leaps into sight. It is this - society? - which Nozick et. al. are uncomfortable with. To be fair to Nozick, he is perhaps an abstainer on the concept of society. In the `Utopia' part of his book, he argues that as individuals we have the freedom to choose whichever society we might, assuming we can find enough other individuals who share our value preferences. And indeed, by going back to the first ethical principle of `don't do to others what you don't want them to do to you' Nozick can claim that he's arguing from a principle which recognises other individuals as equal to - if completely separate - from ourselves.
If there is a flaw in the libertarian and/or Nightwatchman State position, we must seek it in the so-called inviolability of private property rights. Nozick is very fuzzy here, and such fuzziness is telling. He disagrees with the Lockian formula for justice in acquisition and replaces it with a notion that there is justice in acquisition if by such acquisition we don't leave others any worse off. If we do, then compensation (however determined) is due. That's a very `nice' principle, but it seems to me to be a fairytale. A libertarian political philosophy has to, at some stage, come to grips with the notion of origins, and it is here that Nozick fails. Can there ever be justice in acquisition of private property? How much property is needed? Can somebody allowably grab more than others? If so, then they will have more `freedom' than the rest, and more liberty. A secondary consideration has to do with demographics. Libertarianism seems to me to be a view-point ideally suited to frontier communities. Where are we to find such communities these days? And how could you possible recreate them?
A final word on the usual association of libertarianism and free-market economics. Clearly Nozick thinks that only the unfettered operations of a free-market can sort out the competing claims of individuals in a State Of Nature; and that through such operations a minimal or Nightwatchman State can arise. He is, to be fair, agnostic on the rights of individuals to choose other forms of economic arrangements in his Utopia. But I suspect that he'll have his bets firmly behind the capitalists who will out-compete all other social systems...

Nozick may or may not be a genius. I'll never know. Why will I never know? Because the man has no ability to actually convey a thought in a method of communication that I find easy to digest. As a thinker, he might be great. As a writer, he clearly needs some work. I felt like I was reading a contract.
So, I profess that I did not finish the book. I read roughly half of it before I decided that my time was not worth it. It was painful.
As to the text of the book, Nozick wavers between having some interesting thoughts and some purely academic/unrealistic thoughts. One problem with the book is the philosophy that puts individual rights as the main assumption. In fact, that's the first sentence. As a fellow member of Earth, I have to ask where this is based. Sure, his philosophy rests on it, but many later thoughts do not build upon earlier thoughts. Often there is not a procession of ideas, but new ones that spring from this initial one. In other words, there is little building and more jumping to new conclusions based on the same assumption. A very flat thought pattern, of you will.
But the clearer problem with this outlook is that he completely overlooks human nature in trying to set up a minimal state. All one needs to do is look at our current system of government to see that corruption is a human element. Where power exists, people gravitate to. Power corrupts. I believe this sentiment to be true and Nozick never, in my mind, covers this piece of human nature.
As evidence of his thoughts on people's tendency to violate one another, all one needs to do is look at his first section, where Nozick painstakingly defines how frequently one may have his rights violated. If such a comprehensive effort is made to investigate the numerous ways of rights violations, one can only assume that there is a fear that people will innately abuse any right of power that they may get in the minimal state.
There are some good thoughts in the book. In particular, I get a kick out of the question, why is blackmail illegal? It's a good question. Isn't silence just a service rendered? Another good thought is his questioning of rules of war. While a passing thought, it is a good one. The rules of war remove the rules of everyday life. Of course, for every good thought in the book there is a poor one.
For every yin, there is a yang, so to speak. But I say that with a grain of salt because we're not dealing with a yin-yang text, more of a Newton Law-ish text where every good thought has an equal and opposite bad thought.
All in all, I might give the book 3 stars. But since the words are entrenched in obfuscation, I have to say it's 2 stars. One main reason we put words together is to convey an idea to another. When you refuse to play by the rules of communication, you fail in that communication. A book is the ultimate interface of communicating via written words. Nozick fails miserably in that communication.

Nozick's classic is an outstanding book. One of its great virtues is its accessibility to the intelligent layman. This books is alot easier to read than, say, Ronald Dworkin's "Sovereign Virtue" and easier to read than Rawls's "A Theory of Justice". In addition, it is much more focused and tighter than those two books (about 200 pages less than each of them). Nozick stays pretty focused on his main arguments and doesn't stray too far into tangenital side issues, whereas Dworkin and Rawls do much more.
The heart of the book are Chapters 3 and 7. In chapter 3, Nozick lays out his foundations for libertarianism: the idea that individuals are ends in themselves. He claims that libertarian rights follow from treating people as ends and never only as means. The core of Libertarian rights is the idea that in order to deal with people you must have their consent. This treats them as ends because you will only be able to gain their consent if they think that transacting with you or cooperating with you (or whatever) is in their own best interests. Hence, they'll only do so when doing so serves their own ends; requiring consent treats people as ends and not only as means.
In chapter 7, Nozick uses his famous Wilt Chamberlain example to show that egalitarian theories of distributive justice require continual interference with liberty. That is because voluntary transactions lead to inequalities that violate the preferred pattern of distributive justice.
The second part of chapter 7 is a pretty thorough critique of Rawls. Rawls ignores the claims of the most talented and well off and he treats people's abilities as common assets. And more.
So, this is a very good book on Libertarianism. Many have pointed out that Nozick doesn't firmly establish foundations for Libertarian rights. That is true and he admits as much in the Preface. At the same time, the idea of treating individuals as ends in themselves, allied with the idea of self ownership, even if it is just assumed, is still intuitively appealing and seemingly right.
I haven't read the first part on the dispute between anarchists and proponents of the minimal state but I've heard it is quite good as well.
Greg Feirman ([email protected])

This book is brilliant for its microscopic and short term analysis of what is just, but it leaves out the possibility that short term microscopic violations of liberty can ensure the long term maximization of liberty. In this way Nozick's treatise is myopic. His entire treatment of what I would consider the most important critizism of libertarianism (namely the fact that redistrobution is necessary to maintain stable equilibrium of the economic divide due to the fact that well off persons can "use this power to give themselves differential economic benefits") is but one paragraph long (p272) and seriously lacking in credulity.

On the microscopic level, one of my many complaints with Nozick's treatise is how, for example, slavery is to be prevented with only a minimal state. Nozick handles this point by suggesting that "in the short run a more extensive state" could "rectify" this situation (p231). My problem with this response is that the same force that would cause an injustice like slavery would also prevent such rectification. In other words, Nozick ignores the fact that practically speaking a minimal state is often prevented from self-organizing the creation of such a rectifying more extensive sate, and that this point must be taken into account if one wishes to believe that the minimal state is the most just in the long run. Only the extenisve state can insure that gross injustices like slavery do not naturally evolve out of a given system.

In the end, I respect much of Nozick's argument, and it may well be true that mandatory redistribution is unjust for those wealthy folks who do not wish to part with some of their money to help the needy. But that does NOT mean that such persons are not a**holes.

Nozick cannot write at all. It isn't that I am confused by his arguments; rather, he appears to be confused himself. His arguments are entirely unpersuasive and the holes in them are glaringly obvious. I can't understand how anyone in academia has ever taken him seriously. If you want to read a strong framework of social justice, check out John Rawls.

_Anarchy, State, and Utopia_ is considered a libertarian classic, but while it is interesting to read, its value is somewhat marginalized by lack of substance. This is no treatise with consistent methodology -- it's mostly a collection of thought experiments and fanciful ideas. The book is basically comprised of Nozick's hypothetical situations and his timid examinations of them. "Property rights" seem important to Nozick's way of thinking, but he never presents what rights are in any systematic way. The book doesn't "build," it just skirts from one idea to the next without ever reaching satisfying conclusions. Because of this, he faces considerable difficulties and reaches weak conclusions. Why is it so highly regarded? I'm not entirely sure, but I would guess that this book's popularity is due in part to its accessibility and easygoing approach. Yet, its importance has been far too overstated: some people deride scholars for not referring to Nozick's ostensible contributions to libertarian theory, and yet Nozick really contributes nothing to the hard core of libertarian philosophy. One of the most influential chapters in Part I is Nozick's thought experiment on the transformation of a stateless society to a minimal State that violates nobody's rights, but this process is so riddled with confusion and inconsistencies that it fails in practically every respect. The first issue of the Journal of Libertarian Studies was based on a symposium for _Anarchy, State, and Utopia_ and subjected Nozick's formation of the minimal State to withering criticism. That whole idea can no longer be considered meaningful. Part II of the book is pretty good though - it is polemical and offers some classic refutations of John Rawls' "veil of ignorance" and social contract establishing rights. (Rawls doesn't deserve the amount of attention Nozick gives him, however. The veil only applies to epistemological wraiths who float-around without bodies. By virtue of having bodies and exclusive control over them and being able to argue what is or what is not just, private property rights are established a priori, thus necessitating a comprehensive theory for those rights, not vacuous, arbitrary solutions proposed by Rawls). Far more important are writers like Murray Rothbard, Walter Block, N. Stephen Kinsella, and Hans-Hermann Hoppe. Anyone looking for a truly definitive, systematic libertarian treatise is encouraged to read Murray Rothbard's _real_ classic, _The Ethics of Liberty_. Is Nozick's book here worth reading? Yes, but keep in mind it's value has been highly overexaggerated.