Carnage and Culture Landmark Battles in the Rise to Western Power
Carnage and Culture Landmark Battles in the Rise to Western Power book cover

Carnage and Culture Landmark Battles in the Rise to Western Power

Paperback – Illustrated, January 2, 2002

Price
$17.99
Format
Paperback
Pages
544
Publisher
Anchor
Publication Date
ISBN-13
978-0385720380
Dimensions
5.17 x 1.12 x 7.96 inches
Weight
1.08 pounds

Description

“Vivid . . . ambitious . . . Challenges readers to broaden their horizons and examine their assumptions. . . . [Hanson] more than makes his case.”-- The New York Times Book Review “No one offers a more compelling picture of how wars reflect and affect the societies, including our own, that wage them.” — National Review “Hanson . . . is becoming one of the best-known historians in America . . . [ Carnage and Culture ] can only enhance his reputation.” —John Keegan, Daily Telegraph (London)“Victor Davis Hanson is courting controversy again with another highly readable, lucid work. Together with John Keegan, he is our most interesting historian of war.” —Jean Bethke Elshtain, author of Women and War From the Inside Flap ne landmark battles from ancient to modern times--from Salamis, where outnumbered Greeks devastated the slave army of Xerxes, to Cortesx92s conquest of Mexico to the Tet offensive--Victor Davis Hanson explains why the armies of the West have been the most lethal and effective of any fighting forces in the world.Looking beyond popular explanations such as geography or superior technology, Hanson argues that it is in fact Western culture and valuesx96the tradition of dissent, the value placed on inventiveness and adaptation, the concept of citizenshipx96which have consistently produced superior arms and soldiers. Offering riveting battle narratives and a balanced perspective that avoids simple triumphalism, Carnage and Culture demonstrates how armies cannot be separated from the cultures that produce them and explains why an army produced by a free culture will always have the advantage. ne landmark battles from ancient to modern times--from Salamis, where outnumbered Greeks devastated the slave army of Xerxes, to Cortes’s conquest of Mexico to the Tet offensive--Victor Davis Hanson explains why the armies of the West have been the most lethal and effective of any fighting forces in the world.Looking beyond popular explanations such as geography or superior technology, Hanson argues that it is in fact Western culture and values–the tradition of dissent, the value placed on inventiveness and adaptation, the concept of citizenship–which have consistently produced superior arms and soldiers. Offering riveting battle narratives and a balanced perspective that avoids simple triumphalism, Carnage and Culture demonstrates how armies cannot be separated from the cultures that produce them and explains why an army produced by a free culture will always have the advantage. Victor Davis Hanson is the Martin and Illie Anderson Senior Fellow in Residence in Classics and Military History at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, a professor of Classics Emeritus at California State University, Fresno, and a nationally syndicated columnist for Tribune Media Services. He is also the Wayne & Marcia Buske Distinguished Fellow in History, Hillsdale College, where he teaches each fall semester courses in military history and classical culture. He is the author of The Soul of Battle , An Autumn of War , and Ripples of Battle , all published by Anchor Books. His most recent book is The Savior Generals (Bloomsbury 2013). Hanson was awarded the National Humanities Medal in 2007, the Bradley Prize in 2008, as well as the William F. Buckley Prize (2015), the Claremont Institute’s Statesmanship Award (2006), and the Eric Breindel Award for opinion journalism (2002). He divides his time between his farm in Selma, CA, where he was born in 1953, and the Stanford campus. Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved. ONEWhy the West Has WonWhen the trumpet sounded, the soldiers took up their arms and went out. As they charged faster and faster, they gave a loud cry, and on their own broke into a run toward the camp. But a great fear took hold of the barbarian hosts; the Cilician queen fled outright in her carriage, and those in the market threw down their wares and also took to flight. At that point, the Greeks in great laughter approached the camp. And the Cilician queen was filled with admiration at the brilliant spectacle and order of the phalanx; and Cyrus was delighted to see the abject terror of the barbarians when they saw the Greeks.--Xenophon, Anabasis (1.2.16-18)ENLIGHTENED THUGSEVEN THE PLIGHT of enterprising killers can tell us something. In the summer of 401 b.c., 10,700 Greek hoplite soldiers--infantrymen heavily armed with spear, shield, and body armor--were hired by Cyrus the Younger to help press his claim to the Persian throne. The recruits were in large part battle-hardened veterans of the prior twenty-seven-year Peloponnesian War (431-404 b.c.). As mercenaries, they were mustered from throughout the Greek-speaking world. Many were murderous renegades and exiles. Both near adolescents and the still hale in late middle age enlisted for pay. Large numbers were unemployed and desperate at any cost for lucrative work as killers in the exhausted aftermath of the internecine war that had nearly ruined the Greek world. Yet there were also a few privileged students of philosophy and oratory in the ranks, who would march into Asia side by side these destitute mercenaries--aristocrats like Xenophon, student of Socrates, and Proxenus, the Boeotian general, as well as physicians, professional officers, would-be colonists, and wealthy Greek friends of Prince Cyrus.After a successful eastward march of more than 1,500 miles that scattered all opposition, the Greeks smashed through the royal Persian line at the battle of Cunaxa, north of Babylon. The price for destroying an entire wing of the Persian army was a single Greek hoplite wounded by an arrow. The victory of the Ten Thousand in the climactic showdown for the Persian throne, however, was wasted when their employer, Cyrus, rashly pursued his brother, Artaxerxes, across the battle line and was cut down by the Persian imperial guard.Suddenly confronted by a host of enemies and hostile former allies, stranded far from home without money, guides, provisions, or the would-be king, and without ample cavalry or missile troops, the orphaned Greek expeditionary infantrymen nevertheless voted not to surrender to the Persian monarchy. Instead, they prepared to fight their way back to the Greek world. That brutal trek northward through Asia to the shores of the Black Sea forms the centerpiece of Xenophon's Anabasis ("The March Up-Country"), the author himself one of the leaders of the retreating Ten Thousand.Though surrounded by thousands of enemies, their original generals captured and beheaded, forced to traverse through the contested lands of more than twenty different peoples, caught in snowdrifts, high mountain passes, and waterless steppes, suffering frostbite, malnutrition, and frequent sickness, as well as fighting various savage tribesmen, the Greeks reached the safety of the Black Sea largely intact--less than a year and a half after leaving home. They had routed every hostile Asian force in their way. Five out of six made it out alive, the majority of the dead lost not in battle, but in the high snows of Armenia.During their ordeal, the Ten Thousand were dumbfounded by the Taochians, whose women and children jumped off the high cliffs of their village in a ritual mass suicide. They found the barbaric white-skinned Mossynoecians, who engaged in sexual intercourse openly in public, equally baffling. The Chalybians traveled with the heads of their slain opponents. Even the royal army of Persia appeared strange; its pursuing infantry, sometimes whipped on by their officers, fled at the first onslaught of the Greek phalanx. What ultimately strikes the reader of the Anabasis is not merely the courage, skill, and brutality of the Greek army--which after all had no business in Asia other than killing and money--but the vast cultural divide between the Ten Thousand and the brave tribes they fought.Where else in the Mediterranean would philosophers and students of rhetoric march in file alongside cutthroats to crash headlong into enemy flesh? Where else would every man under arms feel equal to anyone else in the army--or at least see himself as free and in control of his own destiny? What other army of the ancient world elected its own leaders? And how could such a small force by elected committee navigate its way thousands of miles home amid thousands of hostile enemies?Once the Ten Thousand, as much a "marching democracy" as a hired army, left the battlefield of Cunaxa, the soldiers routinely held assemblies in which they voted on the proposals of their elected leaders. In times of crises, they formed ad hoc boards to ensure that there were sufficient archers, cavalry, and medical corpsmen. When faced with a variety of unexpected challenges both natural and human--impassable rivers, a dearth of food, and unfamiliar tribal enemies--councils were held to debate and discuss new tactics, craft new weapons, and adopt modifications in organization. The elected generals marched and fought alongside their men--and were careful to provide a fiscal account of their expenditures.The soldiers in the ranks sought face-to-face shock battle with their enemies. All accepted the need for strict discipline and fought shoulder-to-shoulder whenever practicable. Despite their own critical shortage of mounted troops, they nevertheless felt only disdain for the cavalry of the Great King. "No one ever died in battle from the bite or kick of a horse," Xenophon reminded his beleaguered foot soldiers (Anabasis 3.2.19). Upon reaching the coast of the Black Sea, the Ten Thousand conducted judicial inquiries and audits of its leadership's performance during the past year, while disgruntled individuals freely voted to split apart and make their own way back home. A lowly Arcadian shepherd had the same vote as the aristocratic Xenophon, student of Socrates, soon-to-be author of treatises ranging from moral philosophy to the income potential of ancient Athens.To envision the equivalent of a Persian Ten Thousand is impossible. Imagine the likelihood of the Persian king's elite force of heavy infantry--the so-called Immortals, or Amrtaka, who likewise numbered 10,000--outnumbered ten to one, cut off and abandoned in Greece, marching from the Peloponnese to Thessaly, defeating the numerically superior phalanxes of every Greek city-state they invaded, as they reached the safety of the Hellespont. History offers a more tragic and real-life parallel: the Persian general Mardonius's huge invasion army of 479 b.c. that was defeated by the numerically inferior Greeks at the battle of Plataea and then forced to retire home three hundred miles northward through Thessaly and Thrace. Despite the army's enormous size and the absence of any organized pursuit, few of the Persians ever returned home. They were clearly no Ten Thousand. Their king had long ago abandoned them; after his defeat at Salamis, Xerxes had marched back to the safety of his court the prior autumn.Technological superiority does not in itself explain the miraculous Greek achievement, although Xenophon at various places suggests that the Ten Thousand's heavy bronze, wood, and iron panoply was unmatched by anything found in Asia. There is no evidence either that the Greeks were by nature "different" from King Artaxerxes' men. The later pseudoscientific notion that the Europeans were racially superior to the Persians was entertained by no Greeks of the time. Although they were mercenary veterans and bent on booty and theft, the Ten Thousand were no more savage or warlike than other raiders and plunderers of the time; much less were they kinder or more moral people than the tribes they met in Asia. Greek religion did not put a high premium on turning the other cheek or on a belief that war per se was either abnormal or amoral. Climate, geography, and natural resources tell us as little. In fact, Xenophon's men could only envy the inhabitants of Asia Minor, whose arable land and natural wealth were in dire contrast to their poor soil back in Greece. Indeed, they warned their men that any Greeks who migrated eastward might become lethargic "Lotus-Eaters" in such a far wealthier natural landscape.The Anabasis makes it clear, however, that the Greeks fought much differently than their adversaries and that such unique Hellenic characteristics of battle--a sense of personal freedom, superior discipline, matchless weapons, egalitarian camaraderie, individual initiative, constant tactical adaptation and flexibility, preference for shock battle of heavy infantry--were themselves the murderous dividends of Hellenic culture at large. The peculiar way Greeks killed grew out of consensual government, equality among the middling classes, civilian audit of military affairs, and politics apart from religion, freedom and individualism, and rationalism. The ordeal of the Ten Thousand, when stranded and near extinction, brought out the polis that was innate in all Greek soldiers, who then conducted themselves on campaign precisely as civilians in their respective city-states.In some form or another, the Ten Thousand would be followed by equally brutal European intruders: Agesilaus and his Spartans, Chares the mercenary captain, Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar and centuries of legionary dominance, the Crusaders, Hernan Cortes, Portuguese explorers in Asiatic seas, British redcoats in India and Africa, and scores of other thieves, buccaneers, colonists, mercenaries, imperialists, and explorers. Most subsequent Western expeditionary forces were outnumbered and often deployed far from home. Nevertheless, they outfought their numerically superior enemies and in varying degrees drew on elements of Western culture to slaughter mercilessly their opponents.In the long history of European military practice, it is almost a truism that the chief military worry of a Western army for the past 2,500 years was another Western army. Few Greeks were killed at Marathon (490 b.c.). Thousands died at the later collisions at Nemea and Coronea (394 b.c.), where Greek fought Greek. The latter Persian Wars (480-479 b.c.) saw relatively few Greek deaths. The Peloponnesian War (431-404 b.c.) between Greek states was an abject bloodbath. Alexander himself killed more Europeans in Asia than did the hundreds of thousands of Persians under Darius III. The Roman Civil Wars nearly ruined the republic in a way that even Hannibal had not. Waterloo, the Somme, and Omaha Beach only confirm the holocaust that occurs when Westerner meets Westerner.This book attempts to explain why that is all so, why Westerners have been so adept at using their civilization to kill others--at warring so brutally, so often without being killed. Past, present, and future, the story of military dynamism in the world is ultimately an investigation into the prowess of Western arms. Scholars of war may resent such a broad generalization. Academics in the university will find that assertion chauvinistic or worse--and thus cite every exception from Thermopylae to Little Big Horn in refutation. The general public itself is mostly unaware of their culture's own singular and continuous lethality in arms. Yet for the past 2,500 years--even in the Dark Ages, well before the "Military Revolution," and not simply as a result of the Renaissance, the European discovery of the Americas, or the Industrial Revolution--there has been a peculiar practice of Western warfare, a common foundation and continual way of fighting, that has made Europeans the most deadly soldiers in the history of civilization.THE PRIMACY OF BATTLEWar as CultureI am not interested here in whether European military culture is morally superior to, or far more wretched than, that of the non-West. The conquistadors, who put an end to human sacrifice and torture on the Great Pyramid in Mexico City, sailed from a society reeling from the Grand Inquisition and the ferocious Reconquista, and left a diseased and nearly ruined New World in their wake. I am also less concerned in ascertaining the righteousness of particular wars--whether a murderous Pizarro in Peru (who calmly announced, "The time of the Inca is over") was better or worse than his murdering Inca enemies, whether India suffered enormously or benefited modestly from English colonization, or whether the Japanese had good cause to bomb Pearl Harbor or the Americans to incinerate Tokyo. My curiosity is not with Western man's heart of darkness, but with his ability to fight--specifically how his military prowess reflects larger social, economic, political, and cultural practices that themselves seemingly have little to do with war.That connection between values and battle is not original, but has an ancient pedigree. The Greek historians, whose narratives are centered on war, nearly always sought to draw cultural lessons. In Thucydides' history of the Peloponnesian War, nearly 2,500 years ago the Spartan general Brasidas dismissed the military prowess of the tribes of Illyria and Macedonia, who confronted his Spartan hoplites. These men, Brasidas says of his savage opponents, have no discipline and so cannot endure shock battle. "As all mobs do," they changed their fearsome demeanor to cries of fright when they faced the cold iron of disciplined men in rank. Why so? Because, as Brasidas goes on to tell his soldiers, such tribes are the product of cultures "in which the many do not rule the few, but rather the few the many" (Thucydides 4.126).In contrast to these enormous armies of screaming "barbarians" without consensual governments and written constitutions--"formidable in outward bulk, with unbearable loud yelling and the frightful appearance of weapons brandished in the air"--"citizens of states like yours," Brasidas assures his men, "stand their ground." Notice that Brasidas says nothing about skin color, race, or religion. Instead, he simplistically connects military discipline, fighting in rank, and the preference for shock battle with the existence of popular and consensual government, which gave the average infantryman in the phalanx a sense of equality and a superior spirit to his enemies. Whether or not we wish to dismiss Brasidas's self-serving portrait of frenzied tribesmen as a chauvinistic Western "construct" or "fiction," or debate whether his own Spartan oligarchy was a broad-based government, or carp that European infantrymen were often ambushed and bushwhacked by more nimble guerrillas, it is indisputable that there was a tradition of disciplined heavy infantrymen among the constitutionally governed Greek city-states, and not such a thing among tribal peoples to the north.In an analysis of culture and conflict why should we concentrate on a few hours of battle and the fighting experience of the average soldier--and not the epic sweep of wars, with their cargo of grand strategy, tactical maneuver, and vast theater operations that so much better lend themselves to careful social and cultural exegesis? Military history must never stray from the tragic story of killing, which is ultimately found only in battle. The culture in which militaries fight determines whether thousands of mostly innocent young men are alive or rotting after their appointed hour of battle. Abstractions like capitalism or civic militarism are hardly abstract at all when it comes to battle, but rather concrete realities that ultimately determined whether at Lepanto twenty-year-old Turkish peasants survived or were harpooned in the thousands, whether Athenian cobblers and tanners could return home in safety after doing their butchery at Salamis or were to wash up in chunks on the shores of Attica. Read more

Features & Highlights

  • Examining nine landmark battles from ancient to modern times--from Salamis, where outnumbered Greeks devastated the slave army of Xerxes, to Cortes’s conquest of Mexico to the Tet offensive--Victor Davis Hanson explains why the armies of the West have been the most lethal and effective of any fighting forces in the world.Looking beyond popular explanations such as geography or superior technology, Hanson argues that it is in fact Western culture and values–the tradition of dissent, the value placed on inventiveness and adaptation, the concept of citizenship–which have consistently produced superior arms and soldiers. Offering riveting battle narratives and a balanced perspective that avoids simple triumphalism,
  • Carnage and Culture
  • demonstrates how armies cannot be separated from the cultures that produce them and explains why an army produced by a free culture will always have the advantage.

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The Devil in the Details

I have a love/hate relationship with Victor Davis Hanson. Oft times I read his work and cannot help but exclaim the brilliance of his ideas. Other times I read his work and cannot help throwing his junk across the room.

Carnage and Culture belongs in the second category.

Before I attack Carnage and Culture straight-out, I should probably mention the good aspects of this work. Hanson, like always, has written an engaging book. It is highly readable, and though Hanson turns a tad repetitive before his work is done, he moves at a pace fast enough to work around his own cyclical thought process. Carnage and Culture's bibliography is suitably large for the subject matter. Indeed, Hanson's greatest triumph lies in his ability to translate his survey of the extensive historical literature surrounding his subject into terms readily understood by a high school graduate. That the reader does not need any previous knowledge concerning Archimedean Persia, Aztec "Flower Wars", or the naval tactics of the Second World War to understand the arguments presented in Carnage and Culture is a testament to Hanson's place as a master historical writing.

Yet it is the sheer readability and inclusiveness of the book that troubles me. Carnage and Culture does not encourage further investigation of the events, ideas, or peoples discussed. Only rarely does Hanson admit that there are gaps or biases in the historical literature, and never does he stop to acknowledge that many of the arguments that he is making are controversial and contested. For Hanson, events are not subject to uncertainty; each historical occurrence is another piece of evidence perfectly placed to support his irrefutable thesis: the West has bested the rest because Western culture makes them the best soldiers on the field of battle.

The problem with this thesis is that much of the evidence used by Hanson is not very good evidence at all. Consider this statement found midway through the first chapter, "the Ottomans transferred their capital to the European Constantinople.... [but] the opposite was not true: the Crusaders did not transfer the capital of France or England to a conquered Tyre or Jerusalem" (11).

This sentence is wrongheaded on two counts:

1. The magnetism of Constantinople and Jerusalem is irrelevant in a discussion of Western and "Islamic" lethality. While throwing this statement out does support the notion that Western culture is more sophisticated or impressive than Islamic culture, it does nothing to support Hanson's thesis that Westerners are more deadly than their neighbors.

2. This is a blatant distortion of history. While the facts presented in this sentence are true, the implied lesson of Hanson's words, "Westerners do not transfer their capitals into cities of non-Western cultures" is not true. When the Normans conquered Muslim Sicily, they moved their capital to Palermo. In time Tulaytulah, pride of Al-Andalus, was to become Toledo, capital of the Spanish Empire.

Perhaps I am being unfair to Hanson by picking out one bad sentence and dissecting it at length. After all, this deconstruction does not disprove Hanson's thesis, nor cast any of his central points into doubt. By itself, it is nothing -- but the dozen such disingenuous statements found in each chapter make me question the validity of Hanson's argument all together. Carnage and Culture reads as a thesis-first book; instead of assessing the full scope of historical evidence and then developing a contention, Hanson devised a thesis and then looked for sources and incidents that supported his case.

A fair example of Hanson's selective use of history can be found in the people whose words he chooses to include in his work. Hanson quotes Herodotus' and Aeschylus' accounts of the battle of Salamis at length, but he refuses to take contemporary Spanish explanations of their victory against the Mexica seriously. Hanson offers no reason for why we should trust the Greeks' word but not the conquistadors', but the rationale behind his decision is clear enough. The Greeks state that freedom is the reason they beat back the Persians, while the Spaniards claim that their Christian faith and superior intelligence was the reason they rode to victory. The first explanation supports Hanson's thesis; the second explanation is antithetical to it. Thus, in Hanson's words, the Greeks "draw clear moral lessons" (47) about their wars, while the Spaniards "incorrectly attributed" (208) the reasons for triumph.

This double standard is most apparent during the chapters on Pointers and Lepanto, both taken from periods where the West was lagging behind the rest. When the victors of Lepanto wrote tracts thanking God for bringing them victory, they were following the path of their Western forbearers, possessors of a free and open intellectual tradition. But when those who lost at Lepanto (or Pointers) write that the battle's verdict was Allah's will, and Hanson condemns them for failing to produce "analysis... concerning shortcomings in the sultan's equipment, command, and naval organization" (251). Fallacious accounts of Western battles that blamed uncontrollable factors for defeat (such as the "sandstorm" invented by Greek historians to justify the Byzantine defeat at Yarmuk) are never mentioned.

Like the sandstorm-inventing Greeks, Hanson goes to great lengths to explain away Western defeats during the Middle Ages. The Arabs were only successful because they were fighting an "overextended" Byzantium and "barbarian" Visigoths. Hanson goes so far as to call the 20 or so Arab victories between Yarmuk and Pointers a "reconquista" (146) - an absurd idea when one pauses to reflect that cities like Alexandria, Carthage, Syracuse, and Nicosia had been part of the Western world longer than Paris or London have existed. Likewise, Hanson offers the Crusades as an example of Western military might, noting that Europe was "strong enough" (168) to send thousands of soldiers to the Holy Land, but the Arabs were never able to field armies in France or England. Statements like these take confrontations between Europeans and Arabs out of their proper historical context - with the exception of the First, the crusades were a dismal strategic failure for the Europeans, not a triumph of arms to be championed as evidence of Western lethality. Furthermore, Hanson never stops to justify why comparisons such as this are fair game at all; lacking the religious impetus of the Crusaders, for what reason should the Mamluks have sent an Arab army to invade Languedoc or Lombardy when the hoards of the Mongol Empire lie at their door?

Hanson continues this selective view of history in the run up and aftermath of Lepanto. Like the Arab victories in the 600s and 700s, the ascendancy of the Ottoman Empire is explained away as the result of an ailing Byzantine state. This may be true, but it does not explain how the Ottomans were able to defeat Crusader coalitions containing Europe's finest knights not once, but three times during the same period.* Likewise, Lepanto was not the first naval confrontation between the Ottoman Empire and the Holy League - the Ottoman's victory at Djerba (1560) and Preveza (1538) are not accounted for. Only the Ottoman defeat fits within the confines of Hanson's thesis, and only an Ottoman defeat is included.

With that said, the choice of Lepanto as one of Carnage and Culture's key battles was an extremely poor one. Hanson neglects to mention that Lepanto was a strategic failure; the goals of the Holy League's fleet were the protection and recapture of Cyprus. Yet a year after Lepanto the Ottoman fleet would be larger and more advanced than it had been a year before, Cyprus would still lay in Ottoman hands, Venice, fearing for survival, would withdraw from the Holy League, and subsequent engagements of the Ottoman and Holy League's fleet in the Peloponnese would lead to nothing more than a protracted stalemate. When Western armies are decimated in defeats that have little strategic bearing for the loser (Cannae, Isandlwanda, Pearl Harbor), Hanson heralds them as clear examples of the superiority of Western citizen-soldiers and economic practice. Yet when the Ottomans make just as miraculous of a recovery - effectively nullifying the strategic consequences of the greatest defeat ever forced upon the Empire since the time of Tamerlane - Hanson fails to make sweeping claims about the power of the Ottoman command economy.

I have no doubt that Hanson would discard this list of inconsistencies in his work as readily as he has cast aside the "flood of minutia" (463) sent to him by other academics following the publication of this book. After all, myy criticism has focused on the area of history I am most familiar with, and my concerns only knock down two chapters out of eleven. This is not enough to invalidate the book altogether. Yet if Hanson's treatment of the other 1,500 years discussed in Carnage and Culture is as disingenuous as his coverage of the of the Arab and Ottoman worlds, then this book has no valid argument contained in its covers. If the Devil lies in the details, Hanson is haunted by too many devils to make an honest case.

*Nikopol 1396, Varna 1444, and Mohacs 1526.
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An example of bashing square pegs into round holes

The author of this book is a right wing newspaper columnist. He has written a number of other books mainly about ancient Greece.
This book tries to establish a particular line. That is the reason why Europe became powerful was because of the institutions of private property, the success of the market economy, the existence of a free society and the use of well armed infantry forces.
The book examines a number of battles which include the battle of Salamis, a sea battle which occurred in 480 BC between a coalition of Greek City States against the Persian Empire moving on to Guagamela, Cannae Poiters, Tenochitlan, Lepanto, Rorks Drif, Midway and the Tet Offensive.
The problem with the book is that it is mostly nonsense. The style of the book is to not to analyse the various propositions sought to be advanced but rather to use anecdote, factoid and bland assertion to create a picture which is basically false. This of course is not to suggest that private property, and a market economy are not important.
The reason why the book is poor relate to a number of issues. The first is that in reality there is no continuos stable society that contains the values he suggests through Western History. If we look at The Greek City States and the Early Roman Republic, he might well have a point. However for most of recorded history Europe has not had a free society and it has had an economy which is a long way from market capitalism. Following the victories of Alexander at Guagamela (and he was a king not an elected official) the Macedonians controlled a huge empire. That lasted for a long time but it was basically an autocratic society that used mercenary armies in the main. After the collapse of the Roman Empire Feudal Society was again unfree and instead of their being a free market, the economy of most western countries were characterised by guilds and market dominated monopolies.
The second issue is that what is the west anyway? North Africa appears not to have been part of the west although Carthage was a state which was very similar to that of the Greeks. They had a commercial sea faring economy and the government seemed similar. Carthage however for some reason is not seen to be part of the west. Russia which has been similar to more eastern states is seen to be.
The last issue is that the book contains a massive attempt by the author to bash square pegs into round holes. One battle that is discussed in some detail is the battle of Leparto. This is a naval battle in 1571 between the Ottaman Turks and a coalition of powers that included Spain, the Papal States and Venice. The battle of Leparto occurred in year in which the Turks conquered Cyprus from the Venetians after a heroic siege. Concerned about the Turks running rampart through the Mediterranean an uneasy alliance was formed by the Christian powers which led to the battle of Leparto. Despite the defeat the Turks had within a year rebuilt their fleet and taken Tunisia back from the Spaniards. In reflecting on the loss of the battle the Sultan of Turkey said, the loss of Leparto is like having my beard singed, for in time it will grow back. The loss of Cyprus is like the loss of an arm for once an arm is cut off it will never grow back.
In discussing the battle the author suggests that the reason for the victory of the battle by the Christians was the ability of commercial capitalism to build weapons of war such as cannon and arquebuses. He suggests that Turkey did not have the economic wealth of these countries and this was the reason for the defeat and the decline of the Turkish empire. None of this seems true. The ability of the Turks to re-build their fleet was seen at the time as a miracle. To build this many ships as quickly was something which the Christian countries were simply not capable off. The reality was that despite the loss of the battle, the Turks were still within a short time able to mount offensive operations against the Christians. It was not for three hundred years that the Turks were forced to give up Cyprus. Other historians have suggested that the reason for the Turks being contained at the time had less to do with the battle of Leparto but the fact that they had to contend with a series of wars with Persia a strong military power at the time.
A key weakness of this book is that it will make assertions about the comparative commercial strength of the powers involved and provide no evidence to show that there is a basis for the assertion. The book also takes a battle such as this out of context and does not discuss the importance of other Turkish victories and their ability to continue to mount successful military operations.
This is a rather tiresome book to read. Most narrative histories will simply contain a narrative of the relevant events and an argument which is based on the material. This book however relies on anecdote after anecdote, with florid descriptions of military engagements followed by homily after homily on the glories of the west. A very tiresome book to read.
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My background in the study of history and warfare is modest at best. However

During the past six months, I have read two of VDH books and watched several of his appearances on Youtube. I have also read several of his shorter pieces on US politics, International Relations and Global Security.

My background in the study of history and warfare is modest at best. However, many of his arguments and insights appear reasonable. They also cast an optimistic light on the future of the West, capitalism and republican democracies.

The book "Carnage and Culture" is an excellent primer on conflicts. I highly recommend this book, in particular for it's analysis of "what the past can teach us". As I interpret it, for VDH the study of History is not only an end in itself, but can teach us much about the challenges we face today. There are similarities between conflicts in Greece and ancient Rome, and those faced today by the US in the Middle East.

As an Argentine citizen, It was interesting to read (short) comments on the Falklands (Malvinas) 1982 conflict. VDH thesis on the superiority of the "West" (Great Britain) over Argentina appears validated on some (but not all) counts:

(1) Superior fighting skills of a democracy over a "dictatorship" (military government)

(2) The idea that "non-West" (¿¿Argentina??) combatants emphasize excellence in "single combat": this is probably validated by the substantial damage caused by Argentina Air Force and Naval pilots to GB fleet. This last point is not mentioned by VDH but I bring it to the attention of readers.

(3) The miscalculation of the Military Junta on GB reaction possibly a consequence of the junta not understanding GB tradition in the "Western" way of war, as opposed to procrastination, negotiation, etc.The sinking of the ARA Belgrano in effect closed all negotiations, and resulted in a head to head battle.

(4) Classical infantry approach to battle in Goose Green, Mount Longdon, Two Sister and Tumbledown, reminiscent of infantry battles of olden times.

(5) Reading Argentine accounts of land battles, I find some support for VDH idea that free exchange of ideas in military forces of consensual governments contribute to success -- in some cases Argentine junior officers voice objections to strict "top down" command from higher-ups.

However, I have some objections on VDH claim that Argentina had important advantages over GB, advantages that GB superior military skills were able to overcome:

(1) The Malvinas are closer to Argentina than to GB, OK. But this not mean that Argentina had air superiority. On the contrary, Argentine planes flying from the continent had only minutes of autonomy over the islands. This was not the case for carrier-based Harrier jets.

(2) GB received support from the US (last generation Sidewinder missiles, satelite intelligence). GB also receive substantiaal support from Chile (intelligence). Argentina had to hold in reserve in the Argentine-Chile border troops well adapted to cold weather.

(3) From the sinking of the Belgrano onwards, the islands were effectively isolated: nuclear submarine made sea transport impossible. Supplies were carried with extreme difficulty, and in minuscule amounts by air. The Goose Greene garrison did not have 120 mm heavy mortars or field artillery. Several army contingents (such as the one in Gran Malvina) were in danger of running out of food (short rations resulted in "survival" mode, many of the troops losing significant weight).

Summarizing, I am not sure whether "military excellence" per se was the defining factor in land battles, or a combination of excellence (professional soldiers of a First World NATO country vs conscript army of a less-developed economy), as well as considerably more abundant resources + help from US and Chile.

Having said that, VDH book clearly illustrates the nature of war, and in the case of Malvinas is useful for understanding why what happened happened.
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The Worst Kind of Mythology

I read a nice portion of this book for a Conflict in Western Civilization class. I dropped that class before it even started. Hanson is the worst kind of propagandist. Unknowledgeable, young soldiers will die for the lies he lays out in this book. The education provided by the United States school systems, including high schools as well as university and college levels, works just fine. It produces people who will die for lies. The myth that academia is a purely 'liberal' institution is in long need of a vacation. Same thing goes for the media. It would be great to hear Hanson try to explain why western warfare is so great to a Vietnam vet with an amputated leg. Especially if the soldier had the misfortune to have been born with low socio-economic status. It takes a 'chickenhawk' to glorify war. Hanson most certainly fits this profile. It would be nice to put a gun in his hand and send him into war to find out what it's really like.

Hanson's historical sources are terrible. An introductory historical methods class would show just about anyone that Hanson's evidence is questionable at best and deadly at worst. Take, for example, when he writes of how Ottoman soldiers threw oranges at western soldiers who were shooting their rifles at them? Where did he read about this? It could not have been a very reliable primary source. Hanson will write anything to humiliate any armies that had the audacity to fight western forces. Like when he claims that 'Spanish Rationalism' enabled the Conquistadors to easily conquer the Aztecs. He doesn't even mention the impact of diseases or the political instability of Meso-America prior to Spanish invasion.

Who takes all of Herodotus's writings as literal, empirical truths? Hanson, that is who. Amazing. It is up for debate whether Herodotus is 'The Father of History' and/or 'The Father of Lies'. But, the willingness of one historian to uncritically cite a source from over two thousand years ago suggests an unambiguously political agenda. Cicero, commenting on Herodotus's writings a relatively short three-hundred some odd years later even recognized the questionable veracity of these fables. Just remember the ridiculous part of the Frank Miller movie, "300" when an ancient Spartan claims that, "Freedom isn't free" and you will get an idea of what kind of historical accounts Hanson gives in this book. He is imposing far too much of the present on the past. The anachronisms in "Carnage and Culture" are almost as evident as they are in the movie "Bill and Ted's Excellent Adventure".

The example of the Ottomans throwing oranges at western forces that are armed with rifles is a part of his introductory narratives that sound more like Chuck Norris movies than actual historical events. Seriously, remember when John Rambo gunned down about a thousand Vietnamese soldiers without reloading. This is exactely what Hanson's introductions sound like. These certainly are more fiction than fact. That's the liberal media right? It is truly incredible that Hanson fashions himself as an academic rebel by defying the establishment of 'liberal academia'. Why do so called 'conservatives' in the United States (conservatism is in a terrible state in the U.S.) worship arrogance as if it makes someone 'manly'? Seriously, gender mixed with politics is sickening. I would love to see Hanson forced to live in a war zone. Instead, he just calls it like he sees it- from 3,000 miles away after a few thousand or hundred years. All while in the comfort of his upper-class residence in sunny California. Most likely complete with immigrant laborers doing his house work. If only Marx was right about the proletariat.

Let's not forget what Hanson has to say about the wonders of capitalism. For the record, I personally do not think that capitalism is necessarily 'evil'. However, the concept itself can justify some of the worst abuses imposed on the human race. People like Hanson love to abuse the concept. Hanson claims that capitalism was around in the 5th century B.C. during the time of the Greco-Persian wars. I know that other historians do this but what is the point? It has to be political. Free market ideologists, who see the market through theological lenses, turn capitalism into the most unruly concept in order to further their agendas. The most salient example of this is when he claims that capitalism is the best economic system because it recognizes how human nature is fundamentally self-centered. Sorry Hanson, but I like to leave my front door asking myself how I can make the lives of others better. Life isn't all about just me. Although, ultimately, my interests do come first. He further claims that the pursuit of individual wealth benenfits entire nations/cultures as a whole. Check out the chapter on the battle of Lepanto for an analysis of how supply-side economics, inherent in European economic systems, caused the downfall of the Ottoman empire. These anachronisms would be funny if it were not for the prejudice they breed. Jingoism and intolerance are necessary ingredients in Hanson's stew of cultural chauvinism.

Hanson's book is the worst kind of cultural chauvinism. Heaven forbid if someone should be unlucky enough to be born in non-western countries where they have no freedom, fight like cowards, and just about always lose. At one time, it was acceptable to denigrate non-western cultures based on the physical characteristics of the people themselves. This has fallen out of favor. Hanson's book, however, illustrates how imperialist ideologies are still acceptable when coded into the language of culture. Raymond Williams would most likely see this as 'remnant ideology'. Hanson has very little, if any, respect for 'cultures' other than those in western "civilizations". So much for learning from other peoples. Just read the book and find out. Chances are, if you are not an angry, western European male, you have either bought into this culture, or will be infuriated by Hanson's ideologies.

It is interesting that Hanson's book appeared at a time when western hegemony of the globe is in decline. The power of China, India and Pakistan are growing by the day. Perhaps Hanson is nostalgic for a time when Britain ruled over these peoples. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize, as previously mentioned, that Hanson's ridiculous thesis could very well be used to justify the invasion of western powers into just about any other nations. In this sense, Hanson could be categorized as what Antonio Gramsci refered to as a 'traditional intellectual'. He just kowtows to imperialist interests. Read 'The Rebel' by Albert Camus for more on how intellectual reasoning can justify any kind of murder. Hanson gives a recipe for death in "Carnage and Culture".
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Not a book but a collection of essays

There are great historians (Jacques Barzun, Martin Gilbert), near great historians (Stephen Ambrose), and then there are the good. Victor Hanson (VH) belongs to this latter category. Think of "Culture and Carnage" as a series of essays about significant battles, rather than chapters with building blocks of an argument, as VH is ultimately unconvincing in his thesis. He is not convincing because he makes the common mistake of confusing correlation with cause. Yes, the West did win all the battles in his book (that's the correlation), but VH is unable to prove why (that's the cause). Ironically, VH's bete noire, Jared Diamond, understands this principle much better.
In the first chapter VH presents a rambling definition of the western social and cultural values that made western arms superior. He describes the Greeks as having consensual government, equality among the middle class, civilian audit of military affairs, and politics apart from religion, freedom and individualism and rationalism (p. 4, Anchor edition). However, at the battle of Salamis, VH in no way shows how these ideals contributed to victory. That the Greeks were defending their homeland was certainly a motivating factor. Moreover, an important part of the Persian navy, the "experienced Egyptian contingent" (p. 44), did not take part in the battle, therefore the Greeks were more evenly matched. Perhaps the western value that resulted in victory was Fortuna.
Moving forward, how then were these values demonstrated in Alexander's Greece, who by VH's own words Alexander was an unelected king, from a land of masters and surfs? VH asserts that Alexander's father, Phillip, adopted the Hellenic tradition of individual initiative (p, 80). Really? How is this manifest? Phillip also "embraced the rationalist tradition and the disinterested pursuit of science and natural inquiry apart from religion and government" (p. 80). Sounds pretty forced to me, and it's not clear at all how one could extrapolate such nuances thousands of years later. On the following page, not letting his own facts get in the way, VH tells us that Alexander rejected constitutional government and civic militarism. We're only to the second battle of the book, and if VH hasn't already refuted his own assertion (western values equal military might), then he's at least guilty of changing the definition of what western values are. Yet he keeps trying: page 93 VH tells us "only freemen who voted and enjoyed liberty were willing to endure such terrific infantry collisions"; VH just told us Alexander's soldiers didn't vote - which is it?
It rarely gets better. We're asked to believe that the armies that fought at Cannae (Roman) and Potiers (feudal Europe) represented societies that had equality in the middle class, a consensual government, or politics apart from religion. The same can be said for the Spanish from Inquisition, Catholic Spain at the battle of Tenochtitlan. And so on.
Unlike other reviewers, I enjoyed, but did not necessarily agree with, VH's writings about the Vietnam war. Of particular interest are the observations on the impact of television and mass communications on the public's perception of the war. (William Manchester foreshadows this in his WWII memoir, "Goodbye Darkness". Manchester recounts the Pentagon's decision to release photos of dead Marines on Tarawa, and the ensuring public outcry.)
VH's attempted reply to Jared Diamond's (JD) "Guns, Germs, and Steel" is rather puny. Consider the case where VH, while describing the battle of Midway, states that "Japan is thus the classic refutation of the now popular idea that topography, resources such as iron and coal deposits, or genetic susceptibility to disease and other natural factors largely determine cultural dynamism and military prowess." Let's leave "genetic susceptibility" and "cultural dynamism" on the table, ok? For JD, the race has ended by 1500 A.D, when European culture begins to expand and dominate worldwide. By comparison, Japan's rise and fall, coming much later, is just a flash in the pan, hardly a credible counterpoint. Japan, for the most part never had any colonies, was in fact hindered because of a lack of natural resources, and, as VH well describes, adopts the steel of the west. Of course, VH is also offended by JD's statements about European intelligence; he need not be. JD's assertions in this area are wholly subjective and can in no way be substantiated.
At times the writing is peculiar. Consider the vocabulary when discussing death in battle; it is the vocabulary of morbid fascination, and the uninitiated. Samples include "murderous dividends" (p. 4), young men "rotting", "harpooned", or "washing up in chunks", machine gun bullets to the brow, carving and ripping arteries and organs in the belly (p. 7), and "robust physiques turned into goo" (p. 8). There's no shortage of colorful language. In the chapter on Roake's Drift, VH detours to discuss a hypothetical case of a motorcycle gang armed with Uzis taking on a regiment of VMI students, unblemished by misdemeanors or shots fired in anger. How now? What kind of Tom Clancy garbage is that? Further along, in the chapter on Midway, VH confirms Tom Brokaw's theory of generational greatness, when he frets that an "America of suburban, video playing Nicoles, Ashleys, and Jasons" (p.351) would likely never equal the greatest generation. This is a variation on the theory that the hardship of the Depression prepared the United States for the rigors of WWII. I would concede this is partially true, but no generation has a monopoly on duty, honor, or love of country. And don't tell VH that video games are in fact used in a soldier's training.
Read "Culture and Carnage", but do not expect too much. There's lots of interesting information about the battles, but there's really not much else.
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2485 Years of Hindsight

Not before the Greeks, not before the 480 BC battle of Salamis, the largest naval engagement in history, pitting the Panhellenes under Themistocles against the Achaemenid Persians under their king, Xerxes, did personal freedom clash against totalitarianism. The decisive factors in that and the other "Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power" described in Victor Davis Hanson's 463 pages of gore now seem fundamental to civilization, but they were not always so. Hanson's theme is that some six elements in the Western pursuit of war have led us to our current world view. They are 1) personal freedom, which "does not begin earlier than the Greeks," 2) civic militarism, in which duty calls citizens to the defense of their property and ideals, 3) civilian audit, placing limits on the independence of the military, 4) scientific tradition, bringing both its logic and its technology, 5) decisive shock battle by disciplined infantry, 6) and private property, providing soldiers a vested interest in the outcome. Hanson also refers to these factors in aggregate as "secular rationalism," once the reader becomes familiar with the elements of the term. For most of the "case studies," as he calls them, Hanson uses a uniform analytic framework. First, he provides a summary of what happened, with attention to the specific methodology of bloodletting. Second, he presents an explanation (he uses the term "exegesis") of how the victor had developed the specific military superiority described in the summary. Then he interprets the historical significance of the victory. As a professor of the classics, Hanson frequently cites historic antecedents, which he refers to as "the classical paradigm." In addition to Salamis, 480 BC, we get Gaugamela, 331 BC, Cannae, 216 BC, Poitiers, 732 AD, Tenochtitlan, 1521, Lepanto, 1571, Rorke's Drift, 1879, Midway, 1942, and Tet, 1968. The afterward, "Carnage and Culture After September 11, 2001," will comfort any who doubt that we will ultimately defeat global terrorism. Above I stated that most of the case studies follow the same format. The chapter on Vietnam does not. It is more heavily weighted toward exegesis. It is an articulate depiction of why the war tore at America's conscience, and why things turned out the way they did. I have seen nothing better written about America in Vietnam. Overall, this book will give you an appreciation of the copious amounts of blood which have been spilled to create and preserve our Western values. And that bloodletting is far from over.
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Good Thesis, Interesting, But Sometimes a Stretch

Carnage and Culture is an interesting book with an interesting thesis: That Democratic countries are the best war machines since Democracy imbibes its fighters with a spirit and a sense of gain and loss impossible for other societies. Mr. Hanson, despite some flaws does a good job of making the arguments.The book is also an interesting response to Jared Diamond's more deterministic thesis presented in Guns, Germs and Steel.
However, I think the battles chosen were chosen to specifically match the thesis and that a more thorough view of other battles may prove part of the thesis wrong. In other words I sometimes wonder if Mr. Hanson is stretching to prove a point.
I also have some problems with Mr. Hanson's organization. While he makes his points he also seems to bounce around within each section so that the section does not necessarily seem unified by chronology or theme. This also makes parts of the book seem repetitive. This problem is exacerbated by Mr. Hanson's proclivity toward stating a fact multiple times.
Still it is a good book and I found certain sections, like the one on Roarke's Drift especially fascinating.
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Deeply flawed

V.D. Hanson writes really well and draws the reader in. His descriptive passages are evocative and exciting. The text races along at a fast pace. For this reason, I could not give the book 1 star.

The thesis? Well, that's a different matter. It seems astonishingly narrow and parochial to my mind. Many reviewers have already pointed out its many flaws in great detail, but the whole controversy can be boiled down to a simple observation.

The basic fact is this: western armies are not and have never been exclusively wedded to a notion of direct, head-on battle, eschewing ruse, ambush, and manoeuvre. Conversely, non-western armies are not and have never been wedded to ambush, ruse, and negotiation, eschewing direct, head-on battle.

This dichotomy, repeated like a mantra throughout the book, is the cornerstone of everything else Hanson argues to explain the (largely illusory) western military dominance the book claims to document and the west's (totally illusory) commitment to direct, head-on battle without ruse.

Even a perfunctory glance at non-western New Kingdom Egypt or Assyria or China shows that this basic dichotomy is false. In fact, some of the great "western" victories Hanson discusses here (Salamis, Midway) were predicated on ambush and ruse, and thus show up the falsity of his own core dichotomy.

Once that dichotomy collapses, the rest of the argument falls with it.

Hanson's thesis might appeal to cheerleaders of the west (see Newt Gingrich's review), but it is not historically accurate and is therefore unsustainable. See Jared Diamond's *Guns, Germs, and Steel* for a far better job of explaining the underpinnings of European global expansion.
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Answers the question left hanging by Guns, Germs, and Steel

I really enjoyed this book. I suggest reading it after Guns, Germs, and Steel by Jared Diamond. At the end of that book, Diamond leaves the question hanging as to why Western Civilization ended up dominating the globe. This book provides a compelling answer.

I especially liked the section that described how the Spanish Conquistadors defeated the Aztecs. He explains that after landing in Mexico, the Spanish set up a gunpowder factory. All of the ingredients necessary for making gunpowder were there, but the Aztecs hadn't discovered it.

The other thing he points out is that the Aztec way of fighting emphasized capturing their opponents so they could be sacrificed in a ritual. The Spanish concentrated on killing the enemy. This difference and the fact that the Aztec dictatorship was unpopular in surrounding areas are what enabled a relatively small number of Conquistadors to defeat the Aztec empire.
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An Intriguing Idea, Tendentiously Argued

In the aftermath of 9/11, it's simple to see that Victor Hanson is more concerned with proving an emotional and rhetorical point than in drawing a conclusion from the facts, and this book is an excellent example. His argument that western style democracies produce armies that in battle are far more efficient killers than those from non-western cultures, i.e. those without traditions of individual liberty and dissent against the government, is intriguing, but his actual arguments in the book are tendentious and dishonest.

For example, it is a stretch to say that the Rome of the Punic Wars was such a culture. It did have a democratic, legal framework, yet it was also a slave-holding society that pressed slaves into the army, contrary to Hanson's secular worship of the citizen soldier, and switched to dictatorships during military campaigns. That may be power that Hanson and his peers admire, but it is not freedom. Also, in the battles against Hannibal, the Romans were frequently the inferior army, which refutes Hanson's point. The author also makes many, many assumptions that are not supported in the historical record.

In more contemporary times, it's interesting how he cherry-picks Midway as the emblematic example from WWII. He avoids the Western Front altogether. On that front, up until the winter of 1945, the non-democratic German Army was superior to anything the Allies fielded in terms of fighting ability - lacking material and industry to support it - and was mainly defeated by the mass numbers and industrial might of the Soviet Union, whose non-free shock infantry demonstrated that democracy is not required to win wars. He also argues that canard that the US 'lost' Vietnam because of the lack of political will, which is puzzling for an author notionally promoting the idea of dissent. If the public dissents against a war, they demonstrate that values he claims to hold. An no democracy, every, will be able to conquer and maintain an occupation against a nation that desires it's own self-determination. Wasn't there some claim that democracies don't fight democracies?

It's not that this argument cannot be made, it's just that Hanson, like the rest of his contemporaries, shows himself to be essentially puerile, wanting to be on the winning team and claiming virtue for himself based only on might. That's not the value of Western culture.
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