Gallipoli

The prospective reader of this exhaustively detailed history of the ill-fated and frequently condemned Gallipoli campaign should think twice about making this his/her first read on the subject. It is written in a style that seems to assume that the general context and and even certain tactical elements of the campaign are already known and that the reader now needs to be filled in on some of its more miscroscopically trivial aspects. Maps are sketchy, difficult to understand and often nearly impossible to relate to the narrative. There is no map index, the locations referenced in the text are often not shown on the maps, and the physical aspects of the terrain (which are so vital to understanding the immensity of the task facing the invading troops) are barely conveyed by overly simplified contour lines.

The author's reliance on first-person narrative, which appears to make up nearly a third of the 462 pages, is, in a word, excessive. Certainly the experiences and feelings of the soldiers add vital insights into the horror and tragedy of the campaign. However, after a while, the recurring snippets from diaries and letters come to seem more like crutches to poorly constructed narrative style. This is unfortunate, both for the reason that one finds oneself skipping over entire blocks of text to get to back to substance, and because Hart has some very, very interesting points of view that are worth hearing.

My conclusion: read something else first.

Peter Hart has written what must rank as the best history of Gallipoli thus far. What I found most refreshing about this book was his willingness to express opinions clearly based on his interpretations of the facts and the actions of those involved. Many historians and particularly miltary historians fall prey to the tendancy to adopt the middle ground and provide "unbiased" analysis which often excuses even the most blantant ineptitude. Not so Mr. Hart. He positively impales the almost complete lack of realistic strategic analysis leading to the decision to first launch a naval attack on the Dardanelles and then to commit troops to the Gallipoli Peninsula and then turns his attention to the ineptitude of the operational and tactical planning prior to the landings. He then further examines the actions of the senior and mid-level officers who led the assault and these are in the main found wanting. Conversely he is unstinting in his praise for those unfortunate enough, the junior officers and other ranks, to find themselves fighting the battle, whether on the side of Britain and its allies or on the Turkish side. The highlighting of each nation's contribution to the battle is important. While the sacrifice of the British and ANZACs is well known, the actions and bravery of the French have been, perhaps, less acknowledged. As indeed is the toughness and effectiveness of Turkish troops.

His use of quotes from those involved is excellent and it is by reading the words of those caught up in the fighting that one realizes how awful a battle this was, whether to be in the gun turret of a dreadnought hit by a Turkish shell or to find oneself in a trench waiting for the signal to "go over the top". Coupled with his own excellent writing style and the use of Turkish sources that have been lacking from earlier works on this battle this provides the reader with a fast moving, almost novel-like view of the campaign.

One of the best military histories I have read recently. Highly recommended.

This book provides a fascinating account of one of the more pointless exercises in WWI, the Franco-British effort to capture the Gallipoli Peninsula and force the Dardanelle Straits. The strategic goal of this effort was to force Turkey, one of the Central Powers, from the war thus removing the threat posed by Turkey to the Suez Canal and UK and French interests in general in the Near East. Winston Churchill, First Sea Lord of the Admiralty appears to have first conceived of capturing Gallipoli and the principal force behind getting the British War Cabinet to approve the venture.

The author of this book, Peter Hart, makes his viewpoint clear by characterizing the idea as an "idiocy generated by muddled thinking." Although he considers the whole venture doomed from the start that does not prevent him from providing a gripping and probably accurate account of the entire Gallipoli Campaign.

Reading his account of this Campaign one is reminded of an earlier and equally pointless Franco-British effort, the Crimean War some sixty years before. As in the Crimea the Gallipoli Campaign was hampered from the first by poor planning and intelligence. The commanding officer General Sir Ian Hamilton never seemed to develop a sense of either the terrain over which his troops were attempting to fight or of the logistical requirements an of an army on a hostile shore. Like his predecessor, Lord Raglan, General Hamilton appeared to assume that the toughness, courage, and endurance of his troops would make up for everything. As a result the British and French forces suffered appalling losses and unnecessary privations, yet still managed to successfully disengage in the end and escape the horrors of Gallipoli. Hart also notes that General Hamilton and indeed the entire British High Command continually underestimated and denigrated the Turkish Army opposing them. He gives the Turks credit for fighting with courage, tenacity, and skill and in the end out fighting their opponents. Gallipoli was only a footnote to the First World War, but contains useful lessons even today.

Hart's new book is excellent in all respects, in spite of the fact that much of the subject matter, especially the extreme suffering and unnecessary loss of life, is extremely disheartening. Very well researched, and the author's use of first-person accounts and other primary sources--from not just the ANZACS and Brits but also from the Turks and oft-overlooked French--is superb. A sobering and, at times, deeply moving account of one of the great tragedies of military history. Five stars.

Mr. Hart's excellent account interweaves gripping first-person anecdotes from participants in the Gallipoli campaign, thus vividly illuminating its actions in details and participant perceptions not afforded the reader by earlier histories. The reader is also treated to Mr. Hart filling a lacuna in earlier histories, namely his fine narrative of French operations on the Asian side of the Dardanelles. This book suffers only the single flaw of chiefly vacant maps which do not show many of the places mentioned pivotally in the text (it should be noted that this flaw is common among many military histories) and which do not lend a clear image of the critical topography of the peninsula.

As the Oral Historian at the Sound Archive of the Imperial War Museum, one would expect Peter Hart capable of telling a rousing story while confining that story to the facts. With GALLIPOLI, he seems to have succeeded in both cases, although I must take it on faith about the facts, since I am, after all, reading the book to learn them for myself. Most of what I knew about the Gallipoli campaign prior to reading this new work of Mr. Hart's I had gleaned from the film of the same name by Peter Weir. And yet - although he never mentions the film specifically - GALLIPOLI the book reads as though it is precisely these sorts of popularly held beliefs (from all concerned) that Mr. Hart is intent on unraveling. For example, as a result of the film, I had thought that only ANZAC troops had participated in the campaign, though Mr. Hart takes great interest in showcasing the roles of the French, the English, the Indian and the Turkish contributions to the fight, while at the same time countering the myths surrounding Gallipoli in those countries as well. This I found particularly eye-opening, and the sheer number of accounts from the action by the men in their own words were, I thought, seamlessly and masterfully woven into the text. Along with Mr. Hart's critical examination of the events, these snippets from memoirs and letters go as far as any account can toward another of the author's goals, which was to try and give some semblance of what it was like to be at Gallipoli in 1915.

GALLIPOLI has a lot going for it. 'Rousing' puts it mildly - the facts of the campaign hardly need embellished. From the gruesome waste of human lives to the incredible stamina of the forces pitted against one another, the story of the Gallipoli campaign is relentless, and I think I can easily recommend Mr. Hart's version of events as an enthralling narrative as well as a coherent explication of the strategies, tactics and movement involved. But I might also add that GALLIPOLI is a strange amalgamation of history and argument - from the opening sentence of the book, the author returns a definitive verdict on the entire affair. `Gallipoli! It was a lunacy that never could have succeeded, an idiocy generated by muddled thinking `. And it is Churchill for whom Mr. Hart retains a special anger. `Churchill pushed his luck once too often and ended up justly vilified for the dreadful consequences of his strategic incompetence.' While Sir Ian Hamilton, the man in charge of the British forces, is not called out quite so specifically, time and time again the author implies that his mishandling of the campaign in every regard deserves disinterment from history and to be reexamined for its faults. Even Lord Kitchener receives a shot across the bow, as it is hinted that he should have known better than to invest British forces halfway around the world when they were much more in demand just across the channel.

I'm not the one to argue about the judgments Mr. Hart pronounces - as I said before, I knew very little about the campaign to begin with, and for all I know, he is spot-on. In fact, after reading GALLIPOLI, I'm swayed by his conclusions - which is slightly troubling despite my fascination with the account. I highly doubt any historian can claim pure objectivity, but Mr. Hart eschews it completely as he convincingly conveys his perception of the larger narrative, while alternately giving the reader the ground action through the words of the men who experienced it. This whipsaw effect lends credence to the statements he makes about Churchill et al, and what I'm left with is the impression of his analysis as bona fide.

I do not think that should discourage anyone from picking up the book, but I do think it is worth mentioning. While this sort of history is compelling, I do think the reader can be swayed at times to a viewpoint that he or she would not have arrived at on their own, if they had simply been presented with the facts as they are understood, and left to analyze them for themselves.

Recommended, with the above-mentioned caveat.

"Gallipoli" was fantastic. I am normally a fiction reader (at least 90% of my reviews are of fiction books) - and "Gallipoli" for me read like first class "fiction" - which I intend as a high compliment. The pace of the narrative is riveting. The quotes from letters by participants on both sides range from the heart-breaking to the hilarious (almost unbelievably, given the circumstances).

I have small qualms with "Gallipoli". First, it seems to me Hart may overstate his case a bit regarding how badly bungled the operation was by British leadership, in particular by Churchill and General Ian Hamilton. Turkish casualties were at least as high if not higher than Allied casualties, suggesting their leadership was just as callous in ordering suicidal forays, if not more considering their advantage in position. Hart is also very critical of the battle tactics employed by Hamilton at Gallipoli, even if afterwards stating that the tactics of modern warfare as seen in WWI evolved dramatically during the War. Hart even takes the merit out of what he himself portrays as a brilliantly planned and executed evacuation.

Secondly, the narrative and the quotes tell the story very much with a "survivorship bias" - we get first hand accounts typically of the soldiers that survived. What I think this may leave out is the deep despair and fear that life in the trenches meant, and which lead British soldiers to shoot at their own feet (as described in one horrific incident) and Turkish soldiers to desert on the very eve of their victory. Perhaps this is where the fiction writer has an edge even on the exceptional historian.

All in all, however, an absolutely amazing work of careful research, brilliantly converted into a fascinating history. And a book that makes me seriously re-think my preference of fiction over non-fiction.

I got this book as a gift for my husband, who is an avid student of WWI. He is very knowledgeable himself, and he gives this book five stars. It is well-written and well-sourced. Usually, in books of this type, he finds inaccuracies or errors, but not this one. That's saying alot. He recommends it for anyone who wants to learn about one of the great tragic disasters of WWI.

a tad too much intricate detail for what i expected..a lot of minute by minute detail regarding the actions of the soldiers

Angry writers make it hard for me to read. I will say though, what happened would make anyone disgusted with bureaucrats.