Gallipoli (Perennial Classics)

I picked this book up after reading The Guns of August by Tuchman; but the real impetus to investigate the battle of Gallipoli goes back to my visit to Istanbul last summer. I will explain why shortly.

Alan Morehead published this novel in 1956, over halfway between the event and this review. His view on this WWI battle had adequate distance to compare it to the European battles for the three decades after, but retains a trace of British late-imperial irony. All the rationales for the ambiphibious assualt in Turkey are explained, and even the chapters which describe the inconclusive fighting are not widely foreshadowed- I was particularly spellbound by the suspense of the final days as the British and ANZAC forces retreated by sea. I also caught a fascinating glimpse at WWI submarine warfare, the early demise of Winston Churchill, and an eerie warning of Mustafa Kemal's rise to power. Morehead makes the right connections to people/events beyond the Dardanelles without losing focus on the landings. He tends to weight the British side of things, but the reader's interest also lies with the offense. No doubt his access to Turkish military records was limited.

As for Istanbul, I met not a few Kiwis and Aussies there who were making a pilgrimage of sorts to the battleground, half a world away from home. While I was trapsing through the city, they took the excursion into the countryside to see... the location of one of the greatest battles their nation ever fought. I wanted to see what moved them to make the trek, and this book explains it. I wouldn't call it a poignant evocation of a tragic front, events can speak for themselves. Yet this book enhanced my appreciation of a battle that I didn't know much about. I recommend Gallipoli to those who are curious about this oddest of struggles, but I especially recommend it to you who haven't even heard of the place. It deserves our attention.

This book is certainly a classic, as it is one of the first comprehensive overviews of this epic battle. In that sense it may be unfair to review it here with the hindsight of many decades of more extensive archival work done since its publication.

Why is it so important, what makes Gallipoli (Gelibolu) campaign so unique when at around the same time many major powers were involved in just as bloody battles at so many other fronts?

Gallipoli literally gave birth to a Turkish national identity. It marks the break from an Ottoman Imperial character which enabled Ataturk to build a new Turkish Republic out of the ashes of WWI. Gallipoli also ignited Australian passions and for the first time made them proud to be Australians and New Zealanders above all.

From a military history point of view, it was the first large naval landing attempt in modern times. Not only that, first time in history land, naval and air forces were deployed jointly, however clumsily.

It was also a time when empires that were roaming and ruling much of the civilized World for centuries were coming tumbling down. After the dust of WWI settled down, there were no more Ottoman Empire, Habsburgs or Czar's Russia. Great War was the greatest tragedy of all and most exciting and interesting chapter was Gallipoli.

Alan Moorehead has done a good job describing the surrounding events and personalities of this campaign. He has covered details small and personal and large with a journalist's eye rather than a historian which makes the reading enjoyable.

There are some serious shortcomings though. As noted by other reviewers, Turks are mostly missing from the pages, distant and behind the hills, alien. It is not surprising since there is not a single original Turkish source listed in the references and bibliography. It is true that such original material was very limited from the Turkish side at the time, but it does not look like he has put any effort in it either.

All the information about the conduct of the war on the Ottoman side seems to have come from Liman Von Sanders diary. Not only Liman Pasha was not very objective about many aspects of Gallipoli, probably out of concern for his reputation, but he was many times mistaken about key details, writing mostly from memory after the war. This probably explains many material mistakes in the book, some serious and too many to list here.

One can still sense the effects of the Turkish anti-propaganda that British mounted duiring WWI, and the young Turkish Republic, too busy rebuilding a new nation and country to counter or neutralize. Cartoonish descriptions of some of the Turkish generals and Enver Pasha reveal a good dose of condescension. He takes much time repeating the blatant and since debunked Armenian propaganda. He glosses over the fact that Armenians had launched a full scale armed revolt behind the lines at almost exactly the same time Allies started bombardment of Gallipoli.

It must be noted that Liman Pasha, Hamilton's counterpart, had little field experience until this battle. He was brought in as a consultant to reform and re-organize the Ottoman army after the disasters of Russian and Balkan wars. He was a trainer and educator with little war experience. Still he was German and that mattered most to Enver Pasha. Thus, many incompetant and second rate German officers were appointed over the more seasoned Turksih officers. Liman Pasha did not come to his senses until half way through the battle. Hamilton on the other hand was a first rate general, smart, trusted and with real war experience. This contrast does not get enough emphasis in the book.

There is also much made of various material and ammunition shortages on the Allied side. Ottomans on the other hand relied on the handouts from the Kaiser to feed their soldiers. They could not even manufacture the needed artillery shells themselves and they had to be imported. Many of their heavy guns were older than the soldiers manning them, some were antiques, dragged out of a military museum. Allies looked very rich and generous to the Turks. On March 18, Turks fired a total of 2250 shells at the Allied ships. On the Turkish Dardanos battery alone 4000 shells fell that day on the other hand. Turks had a total of only 50 armour piercing shells that day. They had to wait a long time for the Allied ships to come in range since they could not match the range of the Allied guns. Against over 200 machine guns Allies fielded, Turks had only 4 machine guns in the early stages.

There is no mention of the fact that during the landings at Suvla, vast majority of the Turkish troops were located far away from the coast, mostly near the West Gallipoli coast base and at Saros. There was only a very thin line countering the initial Anzac landings and drive. One of the first things Liman Pasha did when he took command was to reverse the strong coastal defense established by the local commanders and pull troops in. Liman Pasha was obsessed with a possible landing at Saros and denied M. Kemal any extra troops to counter the landings which he thought were a ruse. He did not release extra troops to Suvla through the worst of the fighting.

While Moorhead goes through a long laundry list of reasons for Allied defeat, including bad leadership, poor planning and insufficient support, he glosses over the most important reason for the Allied disaster. Turks were galvanized by the humiliation of the Balkan war two years earlier. Nationalism had erupted. It was not so much that Allies came unprepared or were led so poorly but the "sick man of Europe" had one more really good kick left in him.

This book has received so many glowing reviews over its 50 or so years that another one hardly seems necessary. But although I knew the book would be a good one and I thought I knew a few things about the campaign itself, I still found it eye-opening. Of course Moorehead does a masterful job of conveying the ebb and flow of the military confrontation. But he also brings out the potential strategic consequences of various outcomes without resorting to artless what-if scenarios. This is one of the few military histories I would recommend to anyone without hesitation.

The other 5 star reviewers got it right,in my opinion. I just finished it and think it was very well written. I have previously read a little about Gallipoli,saw the movie (not bad), and have read a previous Moorehead book on Darwin so I decided to give it a try. His writing is so interesting that I just ordered the Russian Revolution book by him.

My idea was to glance through the book but I ended by reading it from the first page to the last. What I appreciated very much was that it gave much background for the Allied as well as the German-Turkish political actions as well as a picture of the daily life of the soldiers at Gallipoli. Alan Moorehead's text is always enjoyable to read even in this case when it describes miserable conditions and a war where badly made plans led to fully unnecessary casulties. A very revealing book which also has a pacifistic message.

The account is one-sided. I am sure later books dealt more seriously with the Turks as well as the Anzac Forces. What there is here is good history.

A must read for anyone interested in history and the military experience especially for questionable interventions. This author is beyond the mundane and is exceptionally good.

We really like it!

Very good read.

I recall reading this book years ago in my second year of college. Out of curiosity. And so it's been over 10 years since and I've decided to grab a copy for myself because of the fond memories I have for it after finishing it. Particularly because of the fact that this book covers both the Anzac and Turkish sides of the battle