Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001

This absorbing new book,"Ghost Wars", written by noted journalist Steve Coll, managing editor of the Washington Post, deftly describes and explains the origins, progress, and consequences of the CIA's ill-fated sponsorship of radical Muslim fundamentalists in a concerted effort to turn the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan in the late 1970s into a Russian version of Vietnam. The devil lies in the details, as they say, and Mr. Coll does a yeoman's job of explaining how the specific actions taken by the United States to influence the long term course of the Soviet aggression against the Afghan people wrought the absolutely catastrophic unintended consequences it did by way of the creation, training and sustenance of the fanatical Arab fringe group that eventually emerged in the early 1990s as Al Queda.
Indeed, it is a tale full of unimaginable arrogance, thoughtless irresponsibility, and ultimate irony that many of the so-called masterminds of the various Arab groups loosely held together by Osama bin Laden's terrorist network were originally recruited, trained, and transported to Afghanistan by the CIA and its front organizations, and many of the most sophisticated of their members learned their tradecraft here in the United States in training courses offered and funded by the CIA. Operating with the cooperation of a number of other national security organizations such as the KGB, the Saudi General Intelligence Department, and the dreaded Pakistani ISI, the covert agents of the Central Intelligence Agency played a dangerous game in creating an effective and often deadly counterforce to the brunt instrument of the Soviet military machine, and by creating the guerilla forces to do so, gave radical Muslim fundamentalists an object lesson in how to fight quite effectively against superior military forces.
In this fashion, the success enjoyed by the Arab terrorists in fighting against the Soviets encouraged them to think about how they could use their newfound capabilities to engage the forces that be within the orbit of the Middle East itself to effect change towards the creation of a theocratic fundamentalist Muslim state, or even a loose confederation, or Caliphate, of them, by employing such terrorist tactics against both the Western powers and (eventually) the Saudi royal family to accomplish their goals. It took us a while to recognize that the rag-tag confederation of Arab `freedom fighters baptized by combat in Afghanistan were now forming into a most formidable and extremely dangerous enemy, one that could hide at pleasure and strike when it suited them best.Moreover, one of the most interesting aspects to the book is the way in which the author threads the story of the growing and evolving threat of Al Queda into the history of what is also transpiring in Afghanistan over that quarter century of time.
Had we not cut and run, for example, after helping to defeat the Soviets, had we stayed behind to aid them in rebuilding the shattered country the Soviets left in their wake, we might have been able to do much to disarm the radical Muslim movement from gaining traction in the first place. Instead, we abandoned them to their misery and incredible tribal hatreds and animosities, and by so doing provided a haven in which radical Muslim fundamentalists could come to power, and thus creating a perfect setting for all that Al Queda did afterward. In tracing the sordid history of how these so-called ghost wars led to what happened later, eventuating in the attacks of the late 1990s and the events of 911, Coll argues powerfully for a more informed, logical, and rational foreign policy, one informed by a keen understanding of the world and our place in it. Until such transformation takes place, our country and we will continue to be at great risk. Enjoy!

While the 9/11 commission attempts to spread the blame for the US attacks across two administrations, Ghost Wars clearly underlines how the world we live in today was forged by so many ambitious, well-intentioned (but incredibly myopic) cold warriors from the 70's and 80's. To get an even better perspective, readers should tackle Leebaert's "The Fifty Year Wound" (another massive tome unfortunately) in advance. The two volumes certainly compliment each other and bridge some obvious gaps.
I was a little perplexed by some of the previous reviewer's comments regarding the need for additional editing. Unlike Leebaert's volume (which I agree could have been gone over a couple more times), Ghost Wars read like a thriller. I ripped through this book in a couple of days. I can't recall a single chapter that did not hold my attention thoroughly. I actually enjoyed the "inside the Beltway " elements - they helped to humanize what might otherwise make for dry historical reading.

This is yet another revealing book on a subject that has assumed foremost global importance since 11 September 2001: The outcome of the shameful methods employed by the USA to win the Cold War struggle with the late USSR. Books such as this present crucial, unpleasant evidence that can no longer be avoided, dismissed or compromised on whatsoever.
The content of Steve Coll's book is built upon useful minutiae and his narrative is qualitatively better and more reasonable than that of other key books appearing on the subject so far.
It is again evident from this book - as also from its other predecessors - that America's criminal marriage of convenience with fanatical barbarous murderous thugs and bigots, plus abetting them - to achieve her "righteous" 1991 victory is more vile than any silly old "gray" Communist dogma (that was decaying anyway) could ever be. From the material Coll has compiled in this book, it is apparent to any reasonable scholar of the subject that the kind of vile trickery and hypocritical facades, together with this vast undercover war that America employed to achieve world domination (not just the victory of "free enterprise" over communism) merits that America doesn't deserve a civilised enemy as Communism was, but that the sort of intangible nightmarish horror presented by militant/revivalist Islam is the right kind of nemesis for this greedy, arrogant world bully that supports (and revives) the Third World's feudal and tribal social status quo and enables massive elitist corruption in those countries, and treats the world as its playground like a spoilt child.
As a dweller of the key Pakistani North Western border city of Peshawar (mentioned throughout this book), who suffered the effects of and witnessed first-hand more or less all the shameful goings on which Steve Coll has documented - happening in my close proximity, all I will say is this: Congratulations, America, you've won your Cold War but you've really earned yourself a nice fix, too, in the process ... You sure won't get out of this one fast, if ever at all ...

I have read Charlie Wilson's War (entertaining book), Taliban (Rashid), Inside Al Qaeda (Gunaratna), and both Robert Baer books, and this easily outdoes them all in regards to depth of information, detail, interviews with key players, and records research. From Coll's usage of Politburo and KGB documents to interviews with all of the main CIA and State players in the aiding of the Afghan mujihadeen in the 80s, this is the most comprehensive book yet. And it is not a "dry read" as one reviewer mentioned, I found it quite the opposite, very hard to put down.

Listening to the news coverage of 9/11 still left a lot of questions unanswered (at least for me). How did the US support of the mujahideen in the 80's metastisize into the Taliban and al Qaeda? Why did the CIA direct its support to the Islamic fundamentalists instead of more moderate secular Afghan rebels? How did the Taliban come out of nowhere to almost take over the entire country in such a short time span? Given the Taliban's human rights' record, why didn't the US move to isolate and marginalize them before 2001? The answers to all these questions and more can be found in Steve Coll's book. (Incidentally, all of the above questions can be answered in a single word: Pakistan. To understand why Pakistan is the answer, read the book.)

Ghost Wars is a comprehensive account of the involvement of the CIA, US policy makers, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Islamic fundamentalists in Afghanistan. While it is impossible for a layman to assess the accuracy of his work, Coll has done extensive research and shows the sources of his information in extensive footnotes. It appears to be a balanced and nonpartisan effort to thoroughly research the events and describe them as best he could to inform the general public. Writing with 20/20 hindsight, Coll indicates which policies were misguided, which decisions were misjudgments, and when missteps in leadership occurred. However, he engages in equal opportunity criticism and avoids pinning blame all on a single scapegoat. And, he also presents the successes of US policymakers and agents. In addition, he does a good job to present both sides of controversial issues so that the reader can understand why a clearly flawed decision (in hindsight) seemed reasonable and understandable at the time.

In summary, it not the most exciting and dramatic book to read, but it is extremely helpful to becoming a well informed citizen and understanding the actions of the US government in Afghanistan. Highly recommended.

The Pros: Ghost Wars is a reasonably balanced, informative, and well-researched presentation of the facts, events, and players surrounding the rise of trans-national Islamic jihadists from the period encompassing the Carter, Reagan, Bush (41), Clinton, and Bush (43) presidencies. The information presented is important background information and will help the reader with a sense of filling in the background information surrounding this important topic before delving into the advocacy literature about the same subject.

The Cons: This book is not exactly a page-turner. The prose is dry - almost like reading a newsletter. Also, the book fails to deliver on its promise of "secret" history. There are no Pentagon Papers-like revelations presented in these pages.

Because the treatment of the material is complete, even-handed, and important, the book deserves 4 stars. Because the writing is bone dry and fails to deliver on its promise, I must deduct from that rating. Call it 3 and one half stars.

This is a book which is really about two things. The first part of the book is a history of Afghanistan from the time of the Soviet invasion to the success of the Taliban in taking over a majority of the country. The second part deals with Osama Bind Laden and attempt by the Clinton and to a lesser extent the Bush regime to deal with him.

Islam to the west appears a strange monolithic religion exhibiting oriental strangeness. The reality of course is somewhat different and it is well illustrated by this book especially in the first half. Saudi Arabia in the 20th Century saw the rise of a fundamentalist sect called Wahhabism. This sect believed that all changes to Islam following 950 CE were wrong. This was significant as it meant a rejection of all more liberalised forms of Islam which had evolved in response to western ideas of democracy the rights and women and the development of secularism.

The success of Whahabism in Saudi Arabia resulted in that country developing into a sort of feudal monarchy with a social system that seems to western notions hopelessly anachronistic and reactionary. However in the 1970's the oil embargo and development of OPEC suddenly transformed Saudi Arabia into an immensely wealthy state. It was able to engage in the setting up of schools and mosques throughout the world preaching its form of Islam.

When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan Saudi Arabia sent millions of dollars through Pakistan to fund the resistance. In addition to money volunteers were sent to fight and to preach. Osama Bin Laden was of course one of the many Saudi volunteers who fought in Afghanistan. The effect of the Afghan war was the radicalisation of Afghanistan. This was something which suited Pakistan the country which became a conduit for the Afghanistan resistance funnelling Saudi money and US weapons to the resistance fighters. After the defeat of the Soviets Pakistan was able to use the training camps in Afghanistan for running their own terrorist war in Kashmir.

It was of course Pakistan who was responsible for the success of the Taliban in providing them with regular Pakistani officers to assist with artillery and other logistic support.

The second part of the book is less interesting and in some ways seems to be an add on. It discusses the growing awareness of the US of the significance of Bin Laden and the attempt by the Clinton administration to do something. Clinton by this state was in the midst of the Lewinsky affair and he was limited in what he could do. The Bush administration had different priorities from that of Clinton's. All in all not a bad book and a good grounding for the growth of a faction of Islam which has changed the world.

Ghost Wars is a very well researched account of the events leading up to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11 2001. It illustrates how the attacks were the culmination of the worst failure by the US intelligence community since Pearl Harbor in 1941.

Here is a sobering description of how it was a failure at all phases of the intelligence cycle, from the setting of priorities and tasks, through the gamut of collection activities, to the analytical, assessment and dissemination processes. As the book illustrates, it encompassed not only the traditional national security and military intelligence agencies but also the myriad law enforcement and specialized agencies involved in counter-terrorist activities.

"The opportunities missed by the United States on the way to September 2001 extended well beyond the failure to exploit fully an alliance ...indifference, lassitude, blindness, paralysis, and commercial greed too often shaped American foreign policy in Afghanistan and South Asia during the 1990's." P 570

"Nor did the United States have a strategy for engagement, democratization, secular education, and economic development among the peaceful but demoralized majority populations of the Islamic world. ...In this way America unnecessarily made easier, to at least a small extent, the work of al Qaeda recruiters." P 571

In retrospect, there is much which could and should have been detected before September 11. This is a work that is well worth reading for a better understanding of how we can fix the intelligence and foreign policy issues.

I spent time in Afghanistan and in Washington in the 1980s. I knew many of the people and was familiar with many of the events covered in this book. It is, by and large, accurate. There are errors of detail and places where the author have been misled by his sources, but these do not detract from the overall value.

However, keep in mind that this is basically the story of how US intelligence was involved in Afghanistan. It is NOT the story of Afghanistan. The sad part is that US intelligence never understood much of the story -- which is why our policies were disastrous in the past and may be so again in the future. So, with that caveat, this book can be recommended, even to old Afghanistan hands.

This is a wonderful book that gave me new insights into how we got to where we are today in the battle with bin Laden and al-Qaeda and makes it clear that this battle really began over a decade ago. Too bad President Clinton didn't approve one of the several plans developed to take bin Laden out. This is a must read for anyone who really wants to understand Iraq and Afghanistan and the war we find ourselves in today.