The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870–1871
The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870–1871 book cover

The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870–1871

First Edition

Price
$18.00
Format
Hardcover
Pages
344
Publisher
Cambridge University Press
Publication Date
ISBN-13
978-0521584364
Dimensions
6 x 0.94 x 9 inches
Weight
1.38 pounds

Description

From Publishers Weekly The brief, seldom-sung but crucial Franco-Prussian war gets its due in this superb history. Military historian Wawro gives a comprehensive and lucid account of the political and diplomatic dimensions of the war, which redrew Europe's map and announced the arrival of the German Empire as a world power, but his emphasis is on the conflict as an omen of the future of warfare. Dominated by the firepower of modern rifles and artillery, the bloody fighting foreshadowed the mass slaughter of World War I, while Prussia's lightning victory over France helped lay the groundwork for that conflict by stoking German militarism and enshrining a tragically mistaken confidence in the kind of onrushing offensives that would be undone by machine guns and trenches. Wawro's account is both a gripping narrative and an analytic tour-de-force. He moves easily between visceral depictions of the chaos of combat and strategic overviews of the unfolding battles and campaigns, providing along the way shrewd character studies of the politicians and generals on both sides. At the same time, he keeps a firm grasp of the foundations of military performance in weaponry, logistics and organization, based on an illuminating comparison between the undisciplined and outdated French army and the supremely professional and meticulous Prussians, whose innovations in tactics, planning, staff work and mass mobilization revolutionized European warfare. Full of colorful details and compelling insights, Wawro's vigorously written account should become the standard treatment of this watershed in military history. Copyright 2003 Reed Business Information, Inc. "The brief, seldom discussed but crucial Franco-Prussian war gets its due in Wawro's gripping narrative history and analytic tour de force." --Publishers Weekly"Wawro has...taken up the challenge, drawing on a wide range of sources to offer a brisk, readable, and sharp account.: --Foreign Affairs"Wawro has written an extraordinary history of the Franco-Prussian War, one of the most significant wars in modern European history...Highly recommended." --Choice"This is an extraordinarily luminous book about not only a war but also a continent and a century. Written with verve and wit, The Franco-Prussian War harnesses scholarship and story-telling to wonderful effect. Geoffrey Wawro has given us a magnificent yarn." --Rich Atkinson, author of An Army at Dawn and winner of the 2003 Pulitzer Prize for History"Wawro's [book] is so much fun to read...an excellent read for professional and interested public alike." Canadian Military History Book Review Supplement"An insigtful account of one of perhaps the most critical European war of the period between the Waterloo and the 'Guns of August'...a readable, often detailed account..." - The NYMAS Review, A.A. Nofi"Military historians will be delighted by the appearance of this clear, well-written and effective operational history of the war...[Wawro] deserves congratulations for his fine narrative." Renaissance Quarterly"Wawro has...taken up the challenge, drawing on a wide range of sources to offer a brisk, readable, and sharp account." Foreign Affairs Book Description Wawro describes the Franco-Prussian War, 1870–1, that violently changed the course of European history. Geoffrey Wawro is Professor of Strategic Studies at the US Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. His previously published books include The Austro-Prussian War (Cambridge, 1996) and Warfare and Society in Europe, 1792–1914 (2000). He is the recipient of numerous awards and prizes, including the Austrian Cultural Institute Prize and the Society for Military History Moncado Prize for Excellence in the Writing of Military History. In 2002, he shared a New Orleans Press Club Award for the live NBC/History Channel coverage of the parade and opening of the D-Day Museum Pacific Wing. He is also the host and anchor of the History Channel's Hardcover History, a weekly interview show with leading historians, statesmen, and journalists. Read more

Features & Highlights

  • The Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 violently changed the course of European History. Alarmed by Bismarck's territorial ambitions and the Prussian army's crushing defeats of Denmark in 1864 and Austria in 1866, French Emperor Napoleon III vowed to bring Prussia to heel. Digging into many European and American archives for the first time, Geoffrey Wawro's Franco-Prussian War describes the war that followed in thrilling detail. While the armies mobilized in July 1870, the conflict appeared "too close to call." Prussia and its German allies had twice as many troops as the French. But Marshal Achille Bazaine's grognards ("old grumblers") were the stuff of legend, the most resourceful, battle-hardened, sharp-shooting troops in Europe, and they carried the best rifle in the world. From the political intrigues that began and ended the war to the bloody battles at Gravelotte and Sedan and the last murderous fights on the Loire and in Paris, this is the definitive history of the Franco-Prussian War. Dr. Geoffrey Wawro is Professor of Strategic Studies at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. Wawro has published two books: The Austro-Prussian War (Cambridge, 1996) and Warfare and Society in Europe, 1792-1914 (Routledge, 2000). He has published articles in The Journal of Military History, War in History, The International History Review, The Naval War College Review, American Scholar, and the European History Quarterly, and op-eds in the Los Angeles Times, New York Post, Miami Herald, Hartford Courant, and Providence Journal. Wawro has won several academic prizes including the Austrian Cultural Institute Prize and the Society for Military History Moncado Prize for Excellence in the Writing of Military History. He has lectured widely on military innovation and international security in Europe, the U.S., and Canada and is host of the History Channel program Hardcover History--a weekly book show with leading historians, pundits, critics, statesmen and journalists.

Customer Reviews

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Most Helpful Reviews

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A note for the reviews below

For those who beleive that Fance was bullied, tricked or cornered into a war for which it was unprepared, let me recommend David Wetzel's scholarly but readable book, "A Duel of Giants." It is the story surrounding Napolean III and Bismark which leads to the war. The war was concieved and nutured by Gramont with the usual collections of lies, truths, half-truths, deceits and pig-headed arrogance. William had no interest in a war, and Bismark was beside himself: on Tuesdays, Thursdays and alternate Saturdays, he was for a war while on Monday, Wednesdays and Fridays divisble by 3 he was against the war. The rest of the time was... well, the rest of the time. Napoleon III had no desire for war. Moltke perhaps found the prospect amusing or exciting or desirable, but his ability to influence policy prior to war was of magnitude epsilon for all arbitrarily small epsilon.

Wawro's willingness to lay this war at the feet of the Prussians will not hold water. The French, mostly Gramont, pushed for war. And it was done in a way not dissimilar to the US 2003 invasion of Iraq: the facts were first said to be this, then that, then something else. When the French commissions got the politicians pinned down, it was found (surprise, surprise, surprise) the politicians had been lying to the people, to each other and, it would seem, even to themsleves.

Professor Wetzel's book is clear that the French pushed the war and that Bismark was wiley enough to turn it to his own self-aggrandizing political ends. Wawro's political anaysis seems to be inapt, which can be the result of politicial or peer pressures which may or may not have been present here.

As is pointed out carefully below, Wawro more or less attempts to add up all the guns of all the sizes which then allows him to conlcude the the Prussians should have won but might not have, were the French not over-fed with wine.

And Monte shoud have easily triumphed over Rommel, would but Rommel play by set-piece rules. Naughty boy, that Rommel.

Simple analysis of the materials of war does not suffice. Adding in the socio-politics is not proof against error. On the road to war there is nearly as much fog as there is in war, belying simple explanations for situations so complex that not even Schrodinger's cat could be sure whether it had survived the opening of the box.
10 people found this helpful
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Franco Prussian War

In the Franco-Prussian War Geoffrey Wawro once again demonstrates a solid command of his subject, from researching minute details to crafting impressive theories with logical conclusions. This book is a follow up to his Austro-Prussian War and often uses that war as a backdrop for events a half a decade later.
The book is an indictment of French generalship that in many ways should have either won the war or at least battled Moltke?s forces to a bloody stalemate. Prussia was not the military machine of perfect tactical execution myth would have us believe. In fact both France and Prussia committed blunders during battles, but Prussia owed much of its early success to the accuracy of its artillery. Bismarck and Moltke were willing to throw thousands of men to their deaths at the hand of the dreaded French Chassepot rifle, while French generals Bazaine and Bourbaki squandered every advantage through inactivity.
In a course of five weeks, German forces had routed every French army leaving Paris open for conquest. But here is where France?s indecisiveness actually aided it. With Napoleon III out of the way, there was no legitimate French government to negotiate a peace. Prussia dispatched forces to the Loire Valley in attempts to defeat any French force in the field, which confounded Bismarck and strained the Prussian economy.
In the end Bismarck forced France to accept a humiliating peace that festered in French politicians hearts and minds for four decades. Though this war represents the end of Bismarck?s use of conflict to realize his realpolitik, the impression on France had been made. One cannot really understand the First World War without first understanding the Franco-Prussian War.
Wawro?s knowledge is incredibly detailed and his writing style is very readable, though casual ?history buffs? will probably not grasp the full comprehensiveness of this magnificent work.
If the book has a fault, perhaps it is the lack of coverage of the Paris Commune and the revolution of post-Second Empire France. He gives this topic brief coverage, but the detail of which he described the road to war and the conflict itself is surprisingly missing.
7 people found this helpful
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It ain't Howard, but it ain't bad!

This isn't a substitute for wading through Sir Michael Howard's tome. But, it is a very readable book on a highly important war that set the stage for WWI. Good maps, excellent prose and good illustrations. If you want to read only one book on the Franco-Prussian war, you won't go wrong here. If you've read Howard, then it isn't going to provide any revelations.
6 people found this helpful
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incompetence versus ineptitude

After reading the previous lengthly reviews, I have decided to add this insight to this book. Its appears that the author is trying to show how the French lost the war then how the Germans won it. Its seem pretty clear from the author's perception that French were pretty incompetenece from the top on down. But that didn't make it a sure thing for the Germans. The author also pointed out that Germans showed plenty of ineptitude of their own during the war. What made the difference between the two was that French military incompetenece and their reliance on their famed Chassepot rifle couldn't off-set German professionalism and their artillery - both elements which proves to be the main factors why the French lost.

I was also reminded that the French army of 1870 looked a lot like the French army of 1940. In both cases, the French were military incompetent and their leadership at the top were totally brain dead. The courage of the individual French soldiers kept them in the game as long as they could but Germans won out in the end. Both times, it was a speedy victory for the Germans.

I thought this book was well written, nicely researched and easy to read. It doesn't bogged you down with overwhelming details and its theme seem to be pretty clear from the beginning and it was from that point of view that the book seem to be written for. Well recommended even for casual reader, I agreed with one previous reviewer that this book won't replaced Howard's book but its a great fresh look.
6 people found this helpful
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Superb Military History

Wawro's book on the Franco-Prussian War is thoroughly researched and well-written. This book offers a detailed look at the causes of the war, the major political and military figures on both sides like Napoleon III and Otto von Bismarck, developments and improvements in military tactics and weaponry, and of course the major battles of the war between France and Prussia.

The contrasts between the French and Prussian armies were stark. The French officers and soldiers were on average older, less disciplined and lacking in high morale. Many of the highest ranking French officers were poor leaders and many were plagued with a defeatist mentality even early on during the conflict. Marshal Bazaine was a good example of this. One of the few advantages the French had was their primary infantry rifle known as the Chassepot, which had a longer range of accuracy and could fire more rounds per minute than the Prussian rifle. However, Prussian artillery would be far superior to that of the French and would play a decisive role in many of the battles.

The Prussians were indeed fortunate to have confronted such hesitant and generally poor French military commanders. Prussian victory was no sure thing at the beginning of the conflict, but they did seem to catch all the lucky breaks they needed to secure victory. This is not to say that the Prussians did not make mistakes. Several impetuous officers who launched several of the battles, including the battles at Spicheren and Gravelotte, paid a high price in terms of heavy casualties for their units as a result of their over zealousness to start a battle. Overall, however, they did seem to demonstrate better mastery of military tactics, including better use of reconnaisance and skirmish lines than their French counterparts. They used massed artillery at pivotal points on the battlefield with major effect and their infantry units could break down into smaller more mobile units to exploit any advantages on the battlefield.

The end result was victory for the Prussians and a humiliating defeat for the French. The results of this war would lead to further political unease and instability in Europe that would only further the tensions leading up to World War I nearly fifty years later. This book is definitely worth reading.
5 people found this helpful
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Praises for Wawro

As an introduction to the Franco-Prussian War, I have little hope that I could have stumbled across a better writer to acclimate me to that history.

After having just read Keegan's "The First World War", itself an excellent and thorough work (which, however, suffered from moving at a pace more compelled by the events than by the author), I wanted to read about one of the origins of conflict, being France's declaration of war on and eventual defeat by the blossoming Prussian Empire, 1870-71. I can say without the slightest hint of gratuity that Wawro's account of that contest is a vibrant literary work.

Let me open by saying that more than just a tale of two armies, Wawro successfully captures the social and political perspectives of the two nations and weaves them seamlessly with the military aspect of the narrative in such a way...well, think of it in musical terms when three notes are used in creating a song, sometimes individually and sometimes as a chord but always within the perfect framework of the song, I guess, would be the way I would like to describe it.

But more than that in making this a great read, and in fact the most compelling factor of all, is simply Wawro's abilities as an storyteller; rather than a dry discourse on an instance in history, I imagine that Wawro must be amongst the great historians for his ability to capture the wonder of the reader. The text has bounce, it finds an interia immediately and sustains it throughout, it is humorous and grave, and he gives it the daring and adventure one normally finds in fiction. He is also impeccable in his choice of quotes further lending to the spirit of the atmosphere he creates of the history.

Marvelous reading! Before I was halfway through the book I also purchased a copy of his history of the Austrio-Prussian War and am enjoying that special circumstance of knowing that when one finishes a fantastic book, there is another waiting on the nightstand.
3 people found this helpful
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engaging, informative

It seems most of the other reviewers of Wawro's book think of themselves as military experts, and I hesitate to write a review of it, but I'm glad I read it. Only occasionally have I read works about military campaigns and instead was looking for a way to broaden my knowledge of European history.

Wawro provides a succinct and highly informative description of the lead up to the war. He concentrates on Louis Napoleon and the dissipation of the French republic during the last years of his reign, and Bismarck and Prussia's success in the development of the modern German state. Wawro also describes the hesitancy the minor German states had with the idea of an allegiance with Prussia, and the reasons the other Great Powers resisted getting involved in this brief war.

Wawro's narrative flows easily and the maps are well done. Still, there is a sameness to the battles themselves. Consistently, the feeble effort by the French leadership and generals is countered by effective German planning and strategy (and often nearly undone by German generals' over exuberance and the confusion of battle). Time and again, the killing power of the better designed French rifle was overwhelmed by the slaughter German artillery was able to inflict on defenseless French armies.

By 1870 armaments had improved to the point that all of the battles were horrible killing fields. Its surprising the "man in the street" didn't develop a deeper resistance to war. Wawro gives a sense of the fear the average soldier felt. I can't imagine being French cannon fodder or a German soldier marching against rifles that could kill effectively from a mile away, and not just running away from these battles. Thousands tried with little success.
3 people found this helpful
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military history at its best

this is an outstanding book, wonderfully written. in every page of this book, the author demonstrates total command of language and details. read this book if you want to understand the great war and the development of the german military machine that took on the world twice in the 20th century. if there is one thing this book demonstrates, it is that the french fighting man, though lacking in the discipline department, though prone to joie de vivre, is as courageous as the fighting man of any other country. it is his bad fortune to be continually led by indecisive political leaders and incompetent military commanders. any good history of the great war will show that the french soldier suffered and endured horrifically but never broke. in world war 2, for weeks after dunkirk, the french army continued to resist heroically. frankly, no army in the world could have withstood the superior tactics and equipment of the german army of 1940. any book about dien bien phu would show how french commanders blundered badly but the french soldier still fought his heart out almost to the very end. these days, it's fashionable to refer to the french as "surrender monkeys", as if the french soldier never had heart for a fight after Napoleon, but anyone who does that is facile in thinking and doesn't know much about history.
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A fascinating book about the war that lit fuze to World War I

The Franco-Prussian war isn't one of history's hot topics, but it should be---and this book is a great way to learn about it.

I read this book because I was interested in learning about the rise of the German General Staff. Instead I got a fascinating story of how a "second-level" power, Prussia, defeated its larger, and supposedly more powerful neighbor, France, and formed the German Empire along the way.

The book revolves around two men, Otto von Bismarck, the German Chancellor, and Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, Chief of the Prussian General Staff.

Wawro starts with the politics of which the war was an extension. Bismarck's wanted to create a German Empire under Prussian leadership, and he orchestrated three wars to do it. The Franco-Prussian war was the last. Moltke was the man who orchestrated Prussia's victory in it.

When the War came, most people expected the large and experience French army to make short work of the upstart Prussians, But this book shows how the better organized, better trained, and better led Prussians destroyed the French. Wawro explains how Prussian reservists could read their orders and Prussian trains could get them to the front, while French regulars, many of whom couldn't read their orders, were sometimes side-tracked for days when their trains didn't come, went to the wrong place, or just sat literally "side-tracked" for days.

Wawro describes a defeat the French would not forget and one they sought to revenge in World War I. The Franco-Prussian war wasn't the cause of World War I---there were more than enough mistakes on both sides in the interim---but it helped inflame the war when it came.

If you like history, this is an enjoyable way to learn it. I like it so much that when a borrower didn't return my first copy, I bought another.
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Great history book!!

I really enjoyed this book.The author does a superb job in explaining how this war got started and gives us a very profound and interesting insight as to how the french and the prussians saw the upcoming war.I especially enjoyed the authors account of Napoleon III.His indecision and lack of initiative was harmful to France.The description of the battles are very good and filled with the human touch.I recommend this book to anybody
2 people found this helpful