The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad

I only became of Dr. Zakaria recently, when I read a piece he wrote called "The Arrogant Empire," a incisive piece on the hubristic and messianic foreign policy of the Bush Administration. After a little research I quickly discovered that Dr. Zakaria is some kind of foreign-policy wunderkind, who became an editor of the presitigious magazine Foreign Affairs at the age of twenty-eight. This book clearly demonstrates that his precipitious climb to the top of the intelletual heap of America is certainly well-deserved.
This book is a remarkable guide to the major challenges, both foreign and domestic, that face America in the twenty-first century. The thesis of this book is essentially that too much democratization and decentralization, two notions that are often hailed as universally good, can be disasterous. This argument is not new, as Dr. Zakaria readily admits. What is new is the contextualization of these problems to the modern world.
The author brilliantly analyzes both foreign and domestic policy through the prism of what he calls "Illiberal Democracy." The analysis is both lucid and cogent, and it is remarkable how much insight exists on every page. Dr. Zakaria is a polymath with prodigious analytical ability, and, as a result, both knowledge and sagacity ooze off the page.
The book ranges from topic to topic, yet still remains coherent. Dr. Zakaria ranges from topics such as Islamic Fundamentalism, to the decline of Congressional presitige on the national political stage, to the virtual disintigration of good governence in the state of California. Despite his reputation as a foreign policy maven, his analysis of domestic affairs is also brilliant:
"The deregulation of democracy has gone too far ... although [sic] none would dare speak ill of present-day democracy, most people instinctively sense a problem ... More intriguingly, in poll after poll, when Americans are asked what public institutions they most respect, three bodies are always at the top of their list: the Supreme Court, the armed forces, and the Federal Reserve. All three have one thing in common: they are insulated from public pressures and operate undemocratically."
One aspect of this book that might grate on American sensibilities is the unabashedly proelite stance this book takes. It serves as almost a rallying cry to the elite to save the institutions that save the commoners from themselves. Although that description may be overexaggerated, undoubtedly this book laments for the halcyon days of a socially-responsible elite in America. However, in the end a lot of this analysis seems correct.
Despite this slight misgiving, this is a brilliant book that provides an intellectual framework for many of problems facing Americans in the twenty-first century, ranging from the scourge of mass terrorism to the cultural malaise here at home.
*****

Along with Tom Friedman, Zakaria is one of the country's top foreign affairs columnists. Unlike Friedman's "Longitudes and Attitudes," however, this book isn't just a rehash of old columns. It's a fascinating look at the past, present, and future of democracy, here in the States and all over the world. The book is essential reading, for example, for anybody interested in the Bush administration's attempt to "democratize" Iraq. Basically, Zakaria argues that although we take the concept of "liberal democracy" for granted, in fact the two components of it have not always gone together. "Constitutional liberalism" is responsible for a lot of the good things we like (rule of law, protection of human rights, etc.), but it hasn't always been associated with democracy. Democracy, meanwhile--rule by a popular majority--isn't always or necessarily connnected to liberalism. With these ideas in mind, the author covers an incredible amount of ground, both historically and geographically. And he writes amazingly well, so every page is not just filled with interesting information, but is also lively and fun. This is that rare kind of "big" book, in other words, that people not only talk about, but enjoy reading. If you liked Fukuyama, Huntington, Bernard Lewis, and stuff like that, you'll just love Zakaria...

America has been fortunate in the last fifty years to have had brilliant authors plotting both the possible and plausible courses of her foreign policy. There are few seminal works though - ones that somehow palpably alter the structures within which everything we consider must necessarily be examined. After Sir Winston's Churchill's warnings of an Iron Curtain descending across Europe, we were given the equally prophetic George F. Kennan who wrote his famous article in Foreign Affairs. As the decades clicked by and liberal democracy seemed to progress unchecked, Francis Fukuyama presented his "The End of History and the Last Man." Another decade sped by, and as globalization and interdependence became the focus for international theory academics, pundits, and practitioners alike, Samuel P. Huntington alerted the world to another problem in his "The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order" (again first printed in Foreign Affairs). More recently we've been given Robert Kagan's "Of Paradise and Power," which, while it certainly puts the trans-Atlantic relationship in perspective for us, the world remains a bit hazy. This is especially true if one considers that neither Huntington nor Fukuyama has been unequivocally disproved; and hence, the world seems all the more complex.
Hence, Fareed Zakaria arrives on the doorstep of our minds, and like those before him, offers his book as a substitute for a crystal ball. Indeed, Dr. Zakaria has received favorable reviews by Huntington, which accurately note that this is a study that hasn't been articulated since Aristotle and Tocqueville. The major premise is this: unregulated democracy undermines liberty and the rule of law. There are a plethora of parallels to be drawn from this domestically (e.g. Benjamin Barber and Don Eberly), or internationally (e.g. Robert Kaplan, Robert Keegan, etc). "The Future of Freedom" will prove to be a profoundly troubling book for those who believe democracy flourishes anywhere it is planted or whatever culture it is grafted onto, and for those who believe democracy is synonymous with freedom. This is a very old argument, one that finds itself centered in political philosophy, and Zakaria's book is all the more important because of its timeliness, and because, even as it is an old argument, it is one that has never reconciled the individual with society, or freedom with duty.
This book will be important to the student especially - whether they read it or not, it will shape the discussions and debates they engage in. They would be better prepared by understanding it. Academics, though many verge on becoming synonymous with abstract and impractical philologasters, will likely also find it the counter-weight to their own, more liberal ideas. Policy makers should read it because I can only presume that it will inform closed-door discussions on whether illiberal democracy abroad is better than no democracy at all. Many books inform us as to where we have been, a few, quickly written texts tell us where we are in greater depth than do newspapers or magazines; however, Mr. Zakaria's text is one of the elite few that manages to show us where we might be going.

Fareed Zakaria is an intellectual whose time has come. Handsome, foreign-born, a possible candidate for the first Muslim Secretary of State, he has the sort of cachet the mass media love. His only problem is that he is a shallow conventional thinker with nothing intelligent to say. But that isn't really a problem for American journalism. The United States is a country where you can say anything you want. But being listened to, if you are to the left of Michael Kinsley or Robert Kerry, is another thing entirely. In the absence of real debate we have pseudo-debate and here Zakaria can shine. His thesis is that we are threatened with too much democracy. Rich and wealthy businessmen do not have sufficient power to insulate themselves and the world economic system from democratic pressure. It's an appalling injustice. Zakaria does not put his argument quite like that. Instead he argues that while Americans naturally wish to encourage free elections in the world, those free elections have the unfortunate habit of electing people like Yeltsin, Putin and Chavez. They would probably elect all sorts of nasty fundamentalists in the Middle East if those countries deigned to have elections. What these countries need is not more democracy, but more liberal constitutionalism. This means not merely the rule of law and an independent judiciary, but also vigorous action to encourage the free market economy and open investment. At the same time American democracy has weakened liberty by unwise congressional reform leading to lobbyists while plebiscites and initiatives have paralysed local government.
It is nice to have Zakaria admit, after decades of Republican cant against elites, that it is really conservative economists who would like to form an elite protected from public scrutiny and debate. But otherwise this is a shallow book. For a start, Zakaria is a remarkably sloppy writer. Thessalonica is a city, not a tribe, and the vicious massacre that he cites occurred there, not in Milan. The National Assembly is confused with the Revolutionary Convention. The final deal between Clinton and Arafat is dated well into Bush's presidency, while the last Mexican presidential election is placed in the wrong year. Disraeli's support for the Second Reform Act is placed in 1882, after he had already died. "The masses, Bismarck believed, would always vote for the pro-monarchial conservatives. He was right." No, he was wrong: soon majorities voted for Socialists, Catholics and Liberals. Zakaria has Saddam Hussein using biological weapons against his own citizens, when he clearly means chemical weapons. At other times Zakaria is simply tendentious. In trying to present a relatively favourable picture of Islam as a whole, he notes that the four largest Islamic countries, Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh and India, have all elected female presidents or prime ministers. He neglects to add that they were all elected because they were the closest relatives of leading male statesman. Much of his discussion of the origins of democracy is conventional guff about the rise of the Catholic Church, the Reformation, the success of Britain, while the Third French Republic gets only a sentence.
More serious are the limitations of Zakaria's picture. He notes how successful liberal democracy has been after military pro-market dictators in Chile, South Korea and Taiwan. He forgets that Chile was a successful liberal democracy for decades before Pinochet overthrew it in 1973, and that Sri Lanka has, despite a brutal civil war, been both more democratic and more liberal than South Korea. Certainly the Germany of Bismarck, von Bulow and Bethmann-Hollweg was more liberal, more democratic and arguably even more capitalist than the South Korea of Colonel Park. He credits South Korea's progress to its attachment to the market and ignores the special hothouse conditions of the cold war that encouraged its rise (Japanese investment diverted there from a blockaded China, more American aid than given to all of Africa for a start. He never asks what the "liberal" consensus of "The New Republic" and "The National Review" has done to deserve Arab support, or, after their support of Yeltsin, Russian support. Often Zakaria pines for a prosperous middle class, which will bring democracy. Yes, I remember how we were all inspired in 1980 when the Communist regime in Poland was brought to its knees by the strike of Gdansk shipyard's middle management. Likewise, COSATU did far more to encourage South African democracy than Paton or Oppenheimer, and one can make the same statement for South Korea, Brazil and much of the rest of the world.
Zakaria blames many of the United States' current problems on excessive democracy. He blames primaries for destroying the old party elites, but that did not stop them from ensuring the nomination of Bush I, Clinton, Dole, Gore and Bush II. He ignores the fact that many of the "democratic" reforms he blames are actually "liberal" ones, such as The Independent Counsel Act and initiatives against raising taxes (a model Hayekian measure). Zakaria comments about media vulgarity, but he ignores signs of media concentration and the oligarchic Telecommunications Act. He blames California's problems on excessively democratic machinery, and not on a ruthless well-organized elite that benefits from an electorate skewed against California's large Hispanic minority. One would better off reading Mike Davis' "City of Quartz" and "Dead Cities." Likewise one would be better off reading Lizabeth Cohen on credit cards and Deborah Rhode's "In the Interests of Justice," rather than blaming "democracy" for the fall of legal integrity. His vision of democracy says nothing about free trade unions, gender equality, social welfare or diversity of public opinion. And while he might want Alan Greenspan to be Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board For Life, what do the rest of us do if the economy should ever sink? At the end he twists Woodrow Wilson's famous statement of "making democracy safe for the world." Or for capitalism. Or for the Republican Party. Whichever is easier, and more profitable.

First of all Zakaria puts words together well. His use of the English language is beautiful, making this book a pleasure to read. However, I have some very real concerns with this book. When Peter Jennings says this book, "...is important for all Americans and those who would make American policy" I have reason for concern. Actually, there are very specific reasons why I'm troubled by this book. Let me tell you why.
1. Zakaria is correct; today we judge the value of every idea, institution, and individual by one test: is it popular? Leaders who are daily blown by winds of change cannot focus on long-term objectives. However, leaders who bend to whimsical political pressure are not practicing `democracy' - nobody's casting votes here - they're simply demonstrating how little backbone they have.
2. I do agree with Zakaria that democracy is not `inherently' good. I disagree with him on why this is. Democracy is very similar to freedom, and freedom itself is not `inherently' good. Why?...because freedom can be used for both good and evil. Free will creates an opportunity to choose that which is not good. Democracy does that same thing. A person can vote for a good leader, or a person can vote for a bad leader - the institution of democracy makes no distinction.
3. Zakaria believes that democracy `needs strong limits' to function properly. No, I would suggest that democracy `needs good people' to function properly. See, this is an important difference - and it's not a very politically correct statement. However, a democracy of thieves and robbers will result in leaders and laws that reflect the values of criminals. I believe that's self-evident.
4. Zakaria brings up the example of 1933 Germany electing the Nazis to power. Instead of denouncing the voter's inability to wisely discern, Zakaria blames democracy itself. He joins the ranks of the `blame democracy first crowd'. Regarding 1933 Germany, democracy was merely the tool. The tool was not broken - it's the user! This was a prime case of `user error'.
5. Here's the fundamental problem with Zakaria's book. Instead of starting at the grass-roots and explaining the essential importance of educating people in both knowledge and morality, Zakaria questions if democracy is the best governmental option. This is a critical mistake.
6. I'm not saying the democracy will work at any time at any place. I'm not naïve about that. However, I am willing to say why it won't work at any time and any place, and the answer has nothing to do with democracy and everything to do with a people group's values. Not all values are equal. Not all values are good. Not all values are equally conducive to democracy.
7. Alexis de Tocqueville said, "America is great because she is good, and if America ever ceases to be good, America will cease to be great." This could be said about any democracy, anywhere in the world. A democracy devoid or morals is chaos. I wish Zakaria recognized this and encouraged a means for a better - aka `good' populous - rather than deriding democracy itself.
8. We do not live in a perfect world, and there are no perfect forms of government. Winston Churchill's famous quote is good to remember, "Democracy is the worst form of government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time." It is the least of all evils. Yes, there is a downside to democracy, but there is nothing better. Zakaria's push for an elitist government - a country run by the few - is not only a bad option, it is a disastrous one that fails to consider the nature of the human condition.

This is a fantastic book. If you like international affairs, you will love it. I cannot recommend this highly enough, especially for anyone interested in geopolitical affairs and foreign policy. The book is written with the touch of a fine journalist. It is at once a breeze to read and highly informative.
Zakaria fills the book with interesting research that makes the reader feel as if he or she were participating in an advanced course on globalization, except this class is all fun. There is none of the boring homework or dreary academic reading often associated with political science courses. With a Ph.D. from Harvard, Zakaria is a scholar, but he does not write like your typical academic. His style is easy going and clear, which makes his exceptionally interesting content easier to digest.
The content varies from theories about democratic development to the history of the Catholic Church and its role in the formation of individual liberties. You will learn about why oil-rich nations like Venezuela and Saudi Arabia face difficult paths on the road to democracy. You will also learn about how popular referendums in California may have created more problems than they have solved in that state.
Is it possible to give too much power to the people? Can an autocratic leader be good for a nation? Why do political liberties differ so much from Sinapore to Egypt to the UK?Zakaria explores these and other questions in this fascinating book. Read it and you will be wiser because of it.

First I want to commend the author, Fareed Zakaria, for writing a book that is easy to read, and well written. To take on this topic in the manner he does is courageous to be sure, as the idea of criticizing "democracy" is not one with much support.
Despite the fact that book is researched well, and his ideas are outlined clearly, it is apparent that there is a certain bias inherent in his worldview. For example, he states that "democracy is not inherently good". What does he mean by this? He seems to be trying to start with a premise, and then support it through his conclusions. However, the premise is weak. I do agree that a "democracy" in and of itself does not mean that the result of that "democracy" will be inherently good. Democracy is not a result, but rather a process. A process that can result in positive or negative consequences depending upon how it is used, and by whom participates. Another reviewer here nailed it when he said that a democracy needs "good people" to function properly. This is truly the heart of the matter, and is usually so obvious as to be "self evident". However, Zakaria misses this point entirely.
Another weak point being made is that "in numerous new democratic processes, the elections serve not as a guarantee of liberty, but a legitimization of tyranny". I believe he is at best over simplifying and at worst completely wrong. In the first sense, an election which "legitimizes tyranny" is in effect a self-refuting concept. Either the elections are not truly a democratic process at all by not allowing for free and open decision making by the people (thus the tyranny), or the result of the election is the chosen path by the people. In one case, democracy exists in name only and simply does not really exist at all, and in the other case it has worked as it should. Since democracy is a process by which people determine the outcome, the blame for a negative result of the true use of a democratic process lies with the morality of the people participating, not the process itself. In the examples he uses throughout the book, he seems to miss this point.
He also argues that "liberty depends less on the will of the majority than it does on the institutional safeguards for the rights of minorities." This is a common tactic, but one that isn't the neutral worldview he would have you believe it is. It implies that the "minority" in opinion "should" be treated with the same level of weight as the majority. Why? He seems unaware that this view is in itself a philosophical worldview that has no foundation. Falling into the illogical spiral that is moral relativism, he equates "minority" opinion as being more valid than majority opinion, to the point of saying the failure to safeguard the minority opinion threatens liberty. Strong words indeed, but what does he truly mean by them? Are all minority opinions valid inherently simply because they are in the minority? One hopes not. In this country there are many minority opinions, such as neo-nazi's, and other racist hategroups. Is he implying that because these views are not popular, and not held to the same standard as the majority view of freedom for all that liberty is threatened?
I will agree with him on one thing, democracy in and of itself is not inherently good. Without a moral compass to guide, and standards of morality on which to base judgements of good vs. evil, a democracy can a failure. The majority can be tragically wrong, as he points out as one example of democracy gone badly: 1930's Germany. He is right in implying that the majority view is not always good, but what he in the end fails to do is to provide any solution. One could walk away from his work thinking that there is some formula of the right mix of democracy and dictatorship that will result in a moral and "good" society. Sadly though, democracy is but a process, and with any process, the true determination of whether it is good or bad is the hearts of the people participating. In the end, his views are not new; they are scattered throughout the New Testament of the Bible, where the ultimate consideration for governing and decision making is a reliance on the "law written on our hearts". All other processes, including his idea of liberalizing international politics, will only be as successful as those who participate. Another reviewer quoted Winston Churchill: "Democracy is the worst form of government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time." Nothing in this book suggests otherwise.

Anyone who is a frequent reader of Newsweek or Foreign Affairs will have already recognized the name of Fareed Zakaria, and has already worked their mind through his somewhat different views. That too was my first reaction when I read the New York Times Book Review of this book; and for the most part, I wasn't suprised.
Zakaria is an intelligent political analyst with a gift at subtely seducing you into believing (or accepting) his sometimes extreme opinions. In his latest book he topples probably his most extreme view- that democracy is not the 'golden shrine' of governmental order.
The American Dream since the end of the 20th century has now transformed itself into globalization, and the belief that democracy is the fundamental pillar to a successful society. Zakaria challenges this idea through a series of theories, each of which include one or two examples. He has a bland way of expressing these ideas, but the very fact that he is proposing them is gutsy, and for that the book is enjoyable to read (whether in the end you believe him or not.)
If you are one who blindly quotes de Tocqueville and company without considering the potential risks inherent in democracy, this should be the first book on your reading pile. Not only will it challenge you, but, ironically enough, may (like it did to me), only make my views on democracy more credible (I now have seen the most sensible arguements against democracy, and I feel prepared to rebuke whatever comes my way). I put this book down as millions of thoughts raced through my head. Zakaria has written a wonderful nonfiction book that will make you think, and finally, have a much more well informed opinion (whatever it may be) when you are finished.

Zakaria's analysis of the distintion between "democracy" and "liberty" is well done. It's not new since the point was expressly made at least a couple of centuries ago. Nonetheless, he is quite good at showing by actual example how rule of the majority can have dire effects. The meaning of the word "democracy" has become quite ambiguous in common usage virtually everywhere around the world. Ambiguity in speaking often corresponds with ambiguity in thinking. If the book does no more than clarify the distinction between ends (individual liberty) and means (democratic process)it will be a boon.

The second observation is that liberal democracy, that is, democracy that serves and protects indivdual liberty, seems to require a gestation period of moderate authoritarian (as opposed to totalitarian) rule during which appropriate legal, economic and social institutions are developed. I'm predisposed to agree, if only because I had personally come to this conclusion quite a while before reading the book.

Having acomplished the above, Zakaria turns to what should be done. Here the book becomes weaker. In international policy, Zakaria seems to advise more tolerance for mild dictators. Lee Kuan Yew is the ideal, Pinochet, Franco a few others are acceptable [...]. Being a former colony of the British Empire (North America, India, Kenya, the Antipodes . . .) is certainly helpful. The problem is that on one hand the sun has set on the British Empire, the UN is useless,and the US tax payer unwilling while on the other hand there is only one Lee Kuan Yew and the others typically carry the un palatable air of Fascism upon them. In sum there is no really palatable/practical foriegn policy approach presented.

Regarding domestic affairs Zakaria's observation is that many "democratizing" schemes that were designed to make Congress more responsive to voters instead made them more responsive to lobbyists and "special interests". Examples are campain finance reform, open committee hearings, direct election of Senators. The argument is persuasive. At the very least these should give one pause before entertaining any suggestions about "fixing" the electoral college. Unfortuneatly, Zakaria's proposed solution is to delegate more authoity to non-elected bodies of experts, the Federal Reserve Board being the ideal. This sounds good but would be more convincing if the Federal Reserve's record was not so attributable to just one person. Greenspan won't live forever. Instead of a plan to un-do mistakes, Zakaria's prescription seems to embrace the idea of a technocrat elite. This strikes me as a dubious notion.

Fareed Zakaria's The Future Of Freedom is a timely exposition on many subjects of current concern in this era of regime change. As scary as it sounds at first, Zakaria makes a solid case for NOT shoving a recently freed country immediately towards one person, one vote. He stresses the need for a country that wants to be a good liberal democracy to start with constitutional liberalism (protecting individual liberties, establishing the rule of law, and setting up a good system of checks and balances) before having free and fair elections, lest that country end up as an illiberal democracy with a freely elected despot as a leader. Zakaria uses historical examples from all over the planet and back 200 years and more. I thoroughly enjoyed The Future Of Freedom and recommend it highly, especially to people that think that nation building only means getting folks to the first election.